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Abstract 
This article aims to analyse the regulatory framework of the 
orphan drugs for the treatment of rare diseases. After defining the 
concepts of “orphan drug” and “rare disease” and reviewing the 
U.S. and European regulatory regimes, the essay examines the 
Italian legislation and, in particular, the balance of the current 
distribution of expenditure between public bodies and private 
economic operators. The article reaches the conclusion that current 
Italian framework represents a best practice: it allows the most 
appropriate constitutional balance between public interest, private 
economic operators interest and right to health of individuals.  
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1. The concepts of “rare disease” and “orphan drug”. The 
distinction between orphan drug and innovative drug 
The evocative name of American origin “orphan drug” is 
now in common use throughout the world.  The term “orphan 
drug” refers to medicines for the treatment of rare diseases and 
conditions affecting a limited percentage of individuals1. The high 
research, development, and commercialisation costs for these 
drugs is uneconomical2 for pharmaceutical companies due to the 
small number of potential paying patients; so, being unable to 
“survive alone” in a competitive environment they need to be 
“adopted” by public health system3.  
Legislation must therefore envisage a number of means to 
allow coverage for investment in research and development by 
private companies, including forms of financial or fiscal 
incentives, the distribution of costs between the State and private 
operators in the sector, and temporally limited exclusive drug 
commercialisation rights. The scenario is therefore one in which 
the market alone is unable to yield positive results, entailing 
substantial public intervention in terms of planning and 
management to bring about an adequate balance that will allow 
patients suffering from rare conditions to hope in a cure, and 
                                                   
1 See, ex multis, S. Panunzio, G. Recchia (eds.), Malattie rare: la ricerca tra etica e 
diritto (2007).   
2 In addition to the term “orphan drugs”, the expression “uneconomic drugs” is 
also used. 
3 On the positive effects of competition in the pharmaceutical market, see, ex 
multis, L. Arnaudo, G. Pitruzzella, La cura della concorrenza. L’industria 
farmaceutica tra diritti e profitti (2019). 
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pharmaceutical companies to meet the costs of research and 
development.  
Consequently, European Union legislation has established 
appropriate multi-level administrative procedures for the 
designation of a medicinal product as an “orphan medicinal 
product” and to authorise placing it on the market (marketing 
authorisation), which has led to a specific and favourable regime 
for companies that produce medicines of this kind4. 
A condition is considered “rare” when its prevalence (i.e. 
the number of cases diagnosed at a precise moment in time for a 
given population) does not exceed a certain conventionally fixed 
threshold. In Europe, the current rules on orphan medicinal 
products state that a “[c]ondition with a prevalence of not more 
than five affected persons per 10 thousand is generally regarded 
as the appropriate threshold”5. Community action programme 
runs along the same lines, according to which a rare disease is one 
which does not exceed the threshold of 0.05% of the population, or 
approximately one case per two thousand inhabitants or five cases 
per ten thousand individuals6. More recently, the rules governing 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use have 
established that “severe, debilitating and often life-threatening 
diseases affecting no more than one person in 50,000 in the 
Union”7 are to be regarded as rare. In other parts of the world the 
parameters are different, although quite close to those established 
for Europe: in the United States, conditions affecting less than two 
hundred thousand people are considered rare (approximately 
0.08% of the population; around 7.5 cases per ten thousand 
individuals); in Japan, all conditions that do not exceed fifty 
thousand cases (around four cases per ten thousand inhabitants); 
                                                   
4 Under Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 1999, on orphan medicinal products, point 1 of the 
preamble states that “some conditions occur so infrequently that the cost of 
developing and bringing to the market a medicinal product to diagnose, 
prevent or treat the condition would not be recovered by the expected sales of 
the medicinal product; the pharmaceutical industry would be unwilling to 
develop the medicinal product under normal market conditions; these 
medicinal products are therefore called ‘orphan’”. 
5 See Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000, point 5 of the Introduction. 
6 Programme of Community action on rare diseases 1999-2003. 
7 See Regulation (EU) No. 536/2014, point 9 of the Preamble. 
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in Australia, the parameter is narrower, as conditions affecting 1.2 
people per ten thousand are considered rare. 
Despite the rarity of these conditions, they affect a large 
proportion of the world population. In the United States, between 
twenty and twenty-five million inhabitants suffer from rare 
diseases; in Europe, 7% of the population, or just under thirty-five 
million inhabitants, suffer from such conditions; in Italy, estimated 
figures of over two million affected inhabitants have been 
returned. According to World Health Organization (WHO) 
statistics, rare diseases account for 10% of known conditions and 
are extremely diversified: it is estimated that the number of such 
diseases known and diagnosed falls between the seven- and eight-
thousand mark8. In addition to being very difficult to diagnose, 
about 98% of rare diseases are not currently without 
pharmaceutical treatment of proven effectiveness (only about one-
hundred-and fifty diseases are, at present, curable). This figure has 
serious repercussions: almost 30% of children suffering from a 
rare condition die before the age of five. 
Under current European legislation, a drug for the 
treatment of a rare disease is classified as “orphan” “if its sponsor 
can establish: (a) that it is intended for the diagnosis, prevention or 
treatment of a life-threatening or chronically debilitating condition 
affecting not more than five in 10 thousand persons in the 
Community when the application is made, or that it is intended 
for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of a life-threatening, 
seriously debilitating or serious and chronic condition in the 
Community and that without incentives it is unlikely that the 
marketing of the medicinal product in the Community would 
generate sufficient return to justify the necessary investment; and 
(b) that there exists no satisfactory method of diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of the condition in question that has been 
                                                   
8 Internationally, there are at least three major lists of rare diseases: the National 
Organization of Rare Disease (NORD), the Office of Rare Disease, and 
Orphanet. Upon recommendation of the Italian Ministry of Health, with 
Ministerial Decree No. 279/2001 (Regulation establishing the national network 
of rare diseases and exemption from participation in the cost of related health 
services), the Istituto Superiore della Sanità drew up a list of rare diseases for the 
purposes of exemption from contribution. To exemplify the vastness and 
heterogeneity of the conditions, suffice it to mention glioma, multiple myeloma, 
cystic fibrosis, spinal muscular atrophy, and familial hypercholesterolemia, in 
addition to some better-known diseases, such as AIDS. 
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authorised in the Community or, if such method exists, that the 
medicinal product will be of significant benefit to those affected by 
that condition”9. 
A number of points can be inferred from this definition: a) 
the product of a piece of scientific research must be submitted to 
an administrative procedure in order to obtain specific legal 
recognition; it is therefore subject to on an authoritative provision 
with a view to verifying whether it meets a series of requirements 
established in the regulatory framework10; b) the drug has a 
sponsor11 (often a pharmaceutical company) that submits the 
application for qualification: it follows that the procedure is at the 
request of one party and, therefore, the input comes from a private 
initiative; c) the drug may be defined as “orphan” under any one 
of the following sets of circumstances: the purpose of the drug (it 
must be used to diagnose the condition, as a prophylaxis, or a 
treatment), the severity of the disease (which must involve a threat 
to life or chronic debilitation), statistical data concerning the rarity 
of the disease at a given time (the disease must affect fewer than 
five people in ten thousand at the time the application is 
submitted), a need for the drug due to a lack of other effective 
treatments or the particularly beneficial results that the new drug 
can bring to patients; the second set is open, however, as it is not 
limited by statistical data; given the seriousness of the condition 
and the necessity of the medicine, it is linked to economic factors 
(the uneconomic nature of commercialisation in the absence of 
incentives)12.  
Italian law adds nothing new to the European definition of 
‘orphan drug’, merely referring to Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 
                                                   
9 See Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000. 
10 See the next section about more on this. 
11 Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 identifies the applicant as a “sponsor”, which it 
defines as “a legal or natural person, established in the Community, seeking to 
obtain or having obtained the designation of a medicinal product as an orphan 
medicinal product”. 
12 See also Commission Communication on the application of Articles 3, 5 and 7 
of Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products. Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 847/2000, establishing the provisions for implementing the 
criteria for defining a medicinal product as “orphan”, together with the 
definition of “similar” and “clinical superiority”, sets out more detailed criteria 
to enable applicants to prove that they meet the requirements for orphan 
medicines. 
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and its requirements13. The notion of orphan drug must be clearly 
distinguished from that of innovative drug, with which it is 
sometimes mistakenly confused. While the first concerns a rare 
condition (with all this entails in terms of the disadvantageous 
investment), “innovative” drugs relate to more common diseases 
whose prevalence exceeds the normal thresholds of distribution14. 
Once the degree of innovation has been assessed by the competent 
administrative authorities (in Italy by the Italian Medicines 
Agency, the AIFA), innovative drugs benefit from incentives to 
encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in scientific 
innovation and improved treatments. Innovative drugs are 
identified as such using three parameters: the necessity for the 
treatment, its added therapeutic value, and the quality of evidence 
or the robustness of clinical studies. The need for treatment is 
conditioned by the existence of therapies for a given condition and 
indicates to what extent the new treatment can provide advanced 
responses to existing therapeutic needs; the added therapeutic 
value is determined by the extent of the clinical benefit, if any, that 
the new drug can bring compared with the alternatives available; 
the quality of the evidence is shown by the scientific validity of the 
elements produced to support the innovation. In conclusion, 
innovative drugs too can benefit from incentives due to the degree 
of scientific progress that the product can contribute to achieving, 
but – once on the market – they are able to support themselves 
through sale to a large number of patients, which is not the case of 
orphan drugs. 
In order to examine the numerous legal issues surrounding 
orphan drugs, after focusing on U.S. regulation and other 
comparisons, it may be appropriate to take the analysis of 
organisational structure and procedural dynamics as a starting 
point for obtaining the status of orphan drugs and their 
commercialisation in Europe and Italy. There follows an 
examination of how the price of an orphan drug is established and 
how the exclusive rights normally enjoyed by companies 
commercialising the orphan drug work. The second half of the 
paper focuses on the topic of greatest interest in relation to orphan 
                                                   
13 See Article 15 (8) letters i) and i-bis) of Decree Law No. 95/2012, converted 
into Law No. 135/2012. 
14 F. Anastasi, La tutela della salute e le esigenze della concorrenza: un difficile 
bilanciamento per i farmaci innovativi, in 2 Amministrazione in cammino 1 (2017). 
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drugs, namely the methods of distributing the costs envisaged by 
the various legal systems, with particular reference to Italy. 
We use the European and Italian rules as a point of 
reference, aware that elements of global law and other important 
disciplines in the sector in other countries need also to be 
considered15 – starting from the oldest: the 1983 Orphan Drug Act 
(ODA)16, leading to amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act – which we will use as a measure of comparison 
with the former. 
Ultimately, this paper deals with two fundamental rights of 
the person. The first concerns the protection of the health of 
persons suffering from rare conditions. Diseconomies arising in 
this area must not be allowed to weaken the constitutionally 
protected right to health of patients suffering from such illnesses, 
meaning the right to health treatments of proven effectiveness and 
also to hope in the development of new forms of treatment as a 
result of the progress of pharmacological research. For these 
reasons, the indisputable need to ensure that people suffering 
from rare conditions receive the same treatment and healing 
opportunities as any other patient is the basis of special 
regulations for this type of drug, where the dynamics of the 
economy are largely replaced by corrective measures of an 
authoritative nature. 
The second fundamental right, related to the first, concerns 
more generally the right of access to a drug and the circumstance 
that the major companies operating in the sector across the globe 
may, in order to be able to cover the costs of research and 
development in the absence of a sufficient number of beneficiaries, 
legally enjoy monopoly status, with sometimes serious 
repercussions in terms of costs for patients and/or the community 
(in some legal systems, even to the point of barring treatment, 
effectively condemning patients with rare conditions to death). It 
is necessary to understand what degree of profit margin 
companies need to be guaranteed under these circumstances when 
                                                   
15 With regard to the European (and global) regulation of pharmaceuticals, see, 
among others, A. Spina, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Beyond the State: Global 
administrative law and global administrative law, in E. Chiti, B.G. Mattarella (eds.), 
Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law. Reports, Legal Questions and 
Comparison (2011), 249 ff. 
16 97th Congress, Public Law 97-414, 4 January 1983 (H.R. 5238). 
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they invest capital in finding a cure for rare diseases and what 
dysfunctions are to be avoided in order to prevent excessive 
economic benefits for the pharmaceutical companies and costs that 
are too high for patients and their families to bare. The ideal 
starting point for an analysis of the administrative procedures for 
defining and placing orphan drugs on the market is the legal 
system of the United States, which was the first to introduce rules 
on orphan drugs. 
 
 
2. U.S. regulation 
The United States was the first country to introduce 
regulatory measures to encourage investment by pharmaceutical 
companies in unprofitable fields17. This means, for example, 
providing subsidies and tax incentives or guaranteeing exclusive 
distribution of a drug for a certain number of years, thereby 
ensuring such companies an adequate profit margin. 
 
 
 
                                                   
17 See, ex multis, C.A. Thomas, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug Act, in 12 J.L. & Soc. 
Probs. 413 (1990); C.H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First 7 Years, in 265 (7) 
JAMA 893 (1990); S.E. Lawton, Controversy Under the Orphan Drug Act: Is 
Resolution on the Way?, in 327 (46) Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 327 (1991); J.J. Flynn, 
The Orphan Drug Act: an Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, in Utah L. 
Rev. 389 (1992); A.M. Garber, Benefits Versus Profits: Has the Orphan Drug Act 
Gone Too Far? (1994), 88 ff.; M. Thamer, N. Brennan, R. Semansky, A Cross-
National Comparison of Orphan Drug Policies: Implications for the U.S. Orphan Drug 
Act, in 23 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 265 (1998); G.A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug 
Act: What’s Right with It, Santa Clara Computer & High Tech, in 12 L.J. 299 (1999); 
A.K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, and Distributive Justice: 
The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in 19 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 246 (2002); T. Maeder, 
The Orphan Drug Backlash, in 19 Sci. Am. 80 (2003); D. Loughnot, Potential 
Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan 
Drugs and Abuses?, in 15 Am. J.L. & Med. 365 (2005); R. Rogoyski, The Orphan 
Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity Incentive, in 32 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. 
Rev. 1 (2006); M. Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of 
Intellectual Property, 12 Har. L. Review 1363, 1421 (2011); M. Herder, Orphan 
Drug Incentives in the Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the USA and in 
Canada, in 12 Jour. L. & Biosc. 158, 166 (2016); J.B. Bannister, Regulating Rare 
Disease: Safely Facilitating Access to Orphan Drugs, in Fordham L. Rev. 1889 
(2018). 
SANDULLI – ORPHAN DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES 
484 
 
2.1. The regulatory framework and 
organisational/functional solutions 
The ODA assumes that there is a public interest in the 
development of orphan drugs and consequently in providing 
public incentives following the failure of the market18, granting 
drugs designated as “orphan” special legal status. 
To this end, it provides that, in the event of approval, 
certification or licensing19 of the medicinal product by the Food 
and Drug Administration (hereinafter FDA) for the treatment of 
rare diseases, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Welfare 
will grant a seven-year industrial patent to the researcher or 
pharmaceutical company that submitted the application for 
accreditation of the medicinal product.  
In addition, the Secretary grants funding to cover the costs 
of qualified clinical trials and the development of medical devices 
and medical foods20. This legislation also establishes a number of 
tax incentives. 
Lastly, the ODA provides for the establishment within, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, of an Orphan 
                                                   
18 “The Congress finds that (…): (1) there are many diseases and conditions, 
such as Huntington’s disease, myoclonus, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), Tourette 
syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect such small numbers of 
individuals residing in the United States that the diseases and conditions are 
considered rare in the United States; (2) adequate drugs for many of such 
diseases and conditions have not been developed; (3) drugs for these diseases 
and conditions are commonly referred to as ‘orphan drugs’; (4) because so few 
individuals are affected by any one rare disease or condition, a pharmaceutical 
company which develops an orphan drug may reasonably expect the drug to 
generate relatively small sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug 
and consequently to incur a financial loss; (5) there is reason to believe that 
some promising orphan drugs will not be developed unless changes are made 
in the applicable Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing such drugs and 
to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs; and (6) it is in the public 
interest to provide such changes and incentives for the development of orphan 
drugs”. 
19 These are the three drug accreditation scenarios provided for in Sections 505 
and 507 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and section 351 of the 
Public Health Service Act. 
20 “The term ‘medical food’ means a food which is formulated to be consumed 
or administered entirely under the supervision of a physician and which is 
intended for the specific dietary management of a disease or condition for 
which distinctive nutritional requirements, based on recognized scientific 
principles, are established by medical evaluation”. 
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Products Board21 tasked with promoting, assessing, consulting 
and sector budgeting. 
                                                   
21 “(a) There is established in the Department of Health and Human Services a 
board for the development of drugs (including Biologics) and devices 
(including diagnostic products) for rare diseases or conditions to be known as 
the Orphan Products Board. The Board shall be comprised of the Assistant 
Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human Services and 
representatives, selected by the Secretary, of the Food and Drug 
Administration, the National Institutes Health, the Centers for Disease Control 
and, any other Federal department or agency which the Secretary determines 
has activities relating to drugs and devices for rare diseases or conditions. The 
Assistant Secretary for Health shall chair the Board; (b) the function of the 
Board shall be to promote the development of drugs and devices for rare 
diseases or conditions and the coordination among Federal, other public, and 
private agencies in carrying out their respective functions relating to the 
development of such articles for such diseases or conditions; c) in the case of 
drugs for rare diseases or conditions the Board shall (…) (1) evaluate (…) (A) 
the effect of subchapter B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act on the 
development of such drugs, and (B) the implementation of such subchapter; (2) 
evaluate the activities of the National Institutes of Health and the Alcohol, Drug 
Abuse, and Mental Health Administration for the development of drugs for 
such diseases or conditions, (3) assure appropriate coordination among the 
Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the Alcohol, 
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, and the Centers for Disease 
Control in the carrying out of their respective function relating to the 
development of drugs for such diseases or conditions to assure that the 
activities of each agency are complementary, (4) assure appropriate 
coordination among all interested Federal agencies, manufacturers, and 
organizations representing patients, in their activities relating to such drugs, (5) 
with the consent of the sponsor of a drug for a rare disease or condition exempt 
under section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or regulations 
issued under such section, inform physicians and the public respecting the 
availability of such drug for such disease or condition and inform physicians 
and the public respecting the availability of drugs approved under section 
505(c) of such Act or licensed under section 351 of this Act for rare diseases or 
conditions, (6) seek business entities and others to undertake the sponsorship of 
drugs for rare diseases or conditions, seek investigators to facilitate the 
development of such drugs, and seek business entities to participate in the 
distribution of such drugs, and (7) reorganize the efforts of public and private 
entities and individuals in seeking the development of drugs for rare diseases 
or conditions and in developing such drugs; (d) the Board shall consult with 
interested persons respecting the activities of the Board under this section and 
as part of such consultation shall provide the opportunity for the submission of 
oral views; (e) the Board shall submit to the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives an annual report (…) (1) identifying the drugs which 
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These forms of incentives have led to significant 
development in the orphan drugs sector. As early as 1993, the 
Office of Rare Diseases Research (ORDR) was informally 
established as part of the office of the Director of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the federal agency for health research. 
In the light of its rapid development, Congress passed the Rare 
Diseases Act (RDA) in 2002, which gave the ORDR legal 
recognition. The ORDR is headed by a Director (appointed by the 
Director of the NIH)22. 
                                                                                                                            
have been designated under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act for a rare disease or condition, (2) describing the activities of the 
Board, and (3) containing the results of the evaluations carried out by the Board. 
The Director of the National Institutes of Health and the Administrator of the 
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration shall submit to the 
Board for inclusion in the annual report a report on the rare disease and 
condition research activities of the Institutes of the National Institutes of Health 
and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration; the Secretary 
of the Treasury shall submit to the Board for inclusion in the annual report a 
report on the use of the credit against tax provided by section 44H of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954; and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall submit to the Board for inclusion in the annual report a report on 
the program of assistance under section 5 of the Orphan Drug Act for the 
development of drugs for rare diseases and conditions. Each annual report shall 
be submitted by June 1 of each year for the preceding calendar year”. 
22 More specifically, the tasks of the Director of the ORDR are as follows: “ (1) 
IN GENERAL. - The Director of the Office shall carry out the following: (A) The 
Director shall recommend an agenda for conducting and supporting research 
on rare diseases through the national research institutes and centers. The 
agenda shall provide for a broad range of research and education activities, 
including scientific workshops and symposia to identify research opportunities 
for rare diseases. (B) The Director shall, with respect to rare diseases, promote 
coordination and cooperation among the national research institutes and 
centers and entities whose research is supported by such institutes. (C) The 
Director, in collaboration with the directors of the other relevant institutes and 
centers of the National Institutes of Health, may enter into cooperative 
agreements with and make grants for regional centers of excellence on rare 
diseases in accordance with section 404G. (D) The Director shall promote the 
sufficient allocation of the resources of the National Institutes of Health for 
conducting and supporting research on rare diseases. (E) The Director shall 
promote and encourage the establishment of a centralized clearinghouse for 
rare and genetic disease information that will provide understandable 
information about these diseases to the public, medical professionals, patients 
and families. Reports. (F) The Director shall biennially prepare a report that 
describes the research and education activities on rare diseases being conducted 
or supported through the national research institute and centers, and that 
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Thanks to the RDA, in addition to providing the ORDR 
with specific legal status, funding has been substantially increased 
to foster the development of diagnosis and treatment for patients 
with rare diseases. 
Lastly, in 2012, again as part of the NIH scenario, the ORDR 
became a division of the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences (NCATS), with the task, among other 
things, of overseeing the Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network 
and the Genetic and Rare Diseases Information Center. 
Essentially, the ORDR is therefore tasked with planning 
research on rare diseases, promoting and supporting research, and 
training researchers in cooperation with other health institutions, 
promoting a clinical research network for rare diseases, managing 
and encouraging research cooperation on rare diseases. It will also 
boost scientific opportunities and help to increase international 
cooperation, promoting an extensive programme of scientific 
meetings, providing information concerning rare diseases, and 
will compile an annual report for Congress on the rare disease 
activities of the NIH. 
The other front relating to orphan drugs is that within the 
FDA whose purpose is to perform all the activity that precedes – 
and leads up to – marketing authorisation of the drug. The Office 
of Orphan Products Development (the OOPD) was established 
there in 1983. Its purpose is to assess and develop products 
(medicines, biological products, equipment, medial foods) that 
may be promising in terms of diagnosing and treating rare 
diseases. The task of the OOPD is therefore to promote the 
availability of safe and effective products for the treatment of rare 
diseases by qualifying them as “orphans”. This status allows the 
drug, at any stage of development (research, development, and 
commercialisation), to benefit from incentives to implement them 
                                                                                                                            
identifies particular projects or types of projects that should in the future be 
conducted or supported by the national research institutes and centers or other 
entities in the field of research on rare diseases. Reports. (G) The Director shall 
prepare the NIH Director's annual report to Congress on rare disease research 
conducted by or supported through the national research institutes and centers. 
(2) Principal advisor regarding orphan diseases. - With respect to rare diseases, 
the Director shall serve as the principal advisor to the Director of NIH and shall 
provide advice to other relevant agencies. The Director shall provide liaison 
with national and international patient, health and scientific organizations 
concerned with rare diseases”. 
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until marketing authorisation is granted. In addition to 
collaborating with research and medical institutions, professional 
organisations, universities, government agencies, pharmaceutical 
companies, patients’ associations for persons with rare diseases, 
on receiving a special request from the sponsor, the OOPD 
assesses the scientific and clinical results presented with a view to 
the possible qualification of the product in terms of effectiveness 
for the treatment of rare diseases and the advancement of 
scientific knowledge in the field, also creating the possibility of 
providing incentives for the development of this product. Drugs 
and biological products that are considered promising for the 
diagnosis and treatment of rare diseases are included in the 
Orphan Drug Designation Program; devices that pass OOPD 
screening are included in the Humanitarian Use Device (HUD) 
Program. If a drug or biological product is approved for the 
treatment of rare paediatric diseases, it will come under the Rare 
Pediatric Disease Priority Review Voucher Program. This means 
that a bonus is made available that can be used to obtain priority 
investigation for later marketing authorisation concerning a 
different product. This is a very interesting measure because of the 
originality of the reward system, but also due to the degree of 
importance that the legal system gives the treatment of diseases 
affecting children. Lastly, the OOPD runs various subsidy 
programmes for external subjects: the Orphan Products Grants 
Program allocates funds for clinical research aiming to 
demonstrate product safety and effectiveness; the Pediatric Device 
Consortia (PDC) Grants Program provides funding for the 
development of non-profit consortia with a view to developing 
pediatric medical devices; the Orphan Products Natural History 
Grants Program finances studies to encourage the development of 
knowledge about rare diseases through methods, paradigms, and 
indicators typical of natural history.  
Drugs are classified as “orphan” upon successful 
completion of the procedure, and a seven-year patent is granted to 
the sponsor who submitted the application. In addition to data 
relating to the promoter and the drug (the name and address of 
the promoter, the name and address of the manufacturer, the 
international common name and trade name of the drug), the 
application must contain a description of the condition for which 
the use of the drug is to be used and the conditions of use, as well 
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as the number and main characteristics of the population likely to 
be treated. Furthermore, a description of the drug and its 
risk/benefit ratio or a summary of the main pre-clinical and 
clinical data on the use of the product, as well as basic 
documentation must be provided. Lastly, an estimate of the 
development and distribution costs and an assessment of the sales 
potential in the United States, confirming the lack of profitability 
of placing the product on the market in specific cases, must be 
submitted. The FDA must respond within a maximum of sixty 
days after receiving the request. Information regarding the 
“orphan” status awarded is published in the Federal Register. 
Achieving orphan drug classification and marketing authorisation 
are necessary steps in placing an orphan drug on the market.  
If the drug is apparently identical to a product already 
approved for the same condition, the applicant company must be 
able to demonstrate the clinical superiority of its own drug, which 
will then be considered as a new active substance. The 
effectiveness of the drug must be demonstrated in terms of the 
prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a rare disease. The products 
of more than one pharmaceutical company may be classified as 
orphan drugs for the same ailment, but the period of market 
exclusivity is granted to the sponsor who applies for 
commercialisation first. Competitors have the right to market 
drugs for other ailments during the period of exclusivity.  
Obtaining orphan drug status gives a pharmaceutical 
company market exclusivity for seven years after the drug is 
placed on the market, plus the following benefits for product 
development: a 50% tax credit on the cost of clinical trials 
conducted in the United States; the preparation of written 
recommendations by the FDA regarding clinical and pre-clinical 
studies that must be completed in order to register the new drug, 
and an accelerated FDA registration procedure. 
In certain cases of particular urgency, orphan drugs may be 
made available to patients before they are placed on the market. 
The compassionate use of a Treatment Investigational New Drug 
(T-IND) may be possible when the following conditions are met 
concurrently: the drug must be intended for the treatment of a 
serious or life-threatening condition; no alternative drug or 
treatment is available; the product must already be subject to 
clinical trials and must be in an active phase of marketing 
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authorisation approval. T-INDs are granted for a limited period of 
time.  
 
2.2. Possible misapplications in the U.S. scenario 
As mentioned above, in United States, the orphan drugs 
sector has experienced a surprising and over-rapid development, 
proving to be an important market area for pharmaceutical 
companies23: over recent years, shares in the main companies in 
the sector have reached a rating of 25%, and the gains on sales of 
orphan drugs have been very high. This development has also 
given rise to sensitive application issues. The main problems that 
have come to light are outlined below. 
For some orphan drugs, problems similar to those affecting 
non-orphan drugs have been identified: for example, it has been 
found that the selling price is disproportionate to the costs of the 
drug’s research, development, and production (the case of 
hepatitis C drugs is sadly a well-known example). But there are 
also specific dysfunctions deriving from orphan drug 
classification.  
The first of these is companies seeking orphan drug status 
in order to benefit from subsidies for research and development, 
tax and regulatory incentives, as well as patent benefits, only to 
apply later for permission to market the drug for the treatment of 
non-rare conditions. An emblematic example is a drug that was 
granted orphan status for the treatment of familial 
hypercholesterolemia, and the company enjoyed a significant 
number of economic benefits for development, testing, and 
bringing to the market. After some time, the company applied to 
the FDA for authorisation to market the product for the reduction 
of cholesterol levels in all diabetics, making enormous profits. 
EPO and the growth hormone (very well known for their use in 
                                                   
23 See, ex multis, A.S. Kesselheim, An empirical review of major legislation affecting 
drug development: past experiences, effects, and unintended consequences, in 11 
Milbank Q. 450, 502 (2011); U. Reinhardt, in Probing our moral values in health 
care: the pricing of speciality drugs, 314 JAMA 381 (2015); N. Bagley, B. Berger, A. 
Chandra, C. Garthwaite, A.D. Stern, The Orphan Drug Act at 35: Observations and 
an Outlook for the Twenty-First Century, in J. Lerner, S. Stern (eds.), Innovation 
Policy and the Economy (Volume 19) (2018), 97, 137; J. Sheridan, Billion Dollar 
Orphans: Tension Between the Legal Intent and Social Purpose of the Orphan Drug 
Act, 112 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 731 (2019). 
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doping in sport) followed the same path. The growth hormone is 
used to treat dwarfism in children: there are 10,000 children in the 
USA suffering from this condition, but the drug, which has very 
high prices due to the exclusivity regime, has brought an income 
of 120 million dollars per year.  
It is indisputable that the pharmaceutical companies' 
earnings from orphan drugs are on the steady increase. Suffice it 
to recall the following data: while, in the past, the so-called 
blockbuster drugs (those capable of generating profits in excess of 
at least one billion dollars a year) were intended to treat 
traditional diseases, with a large pool of patients, in the 2015 
ranking for the ten best-selling drugs in the world, seven were 
orphan drugs (the second best-selling drug is Humira which has a 
guaranteed revenue of more than fourteen billion dollars, while 
the other six all exceed revenues of five billion dollars). In the 
United States alone, in 2015, more than one-hundred-and-seven 
billion dollars were spent on the purchase of orphan drugs, and 
further growth in market share is forecast. These substantial 
earnings are mainly due to the cost of orphan drugs, on average 
twenty times higher than traditional drugs. But also – and 
especially – in addition to the abuse mentioned above, the original 
classification as “orphan” is later updated to include other 
“traditional” therapeutic uses: around 15% of the drugs classified 
as orphan are later recommended for other conditions; in Europe, 
eleven of the twenty best-selling orphan drugs have been 
designated for cancer treatment. In addition, orphan drugs can 
easily be used in off-label settings, regardless of the initial strict 
limitations, with all the ensuing benefits.  
A second case of misuse of the special arrangements is the 
ability to enjoy exclusive market of an orphan drug for seven 
years, thus avoiding competition from other companies and 
keeping prices extremely high. In the case of two companies 
working simultaneously on the research and development of an 
orphan drug: the one that arrives first takes all, and the other 
company, despite all the expenses it has had to stand, will be out 
of the game for at least seven years, unless it can prove that its 
drug has a greater or, at least, distinct efficacy compared with the 
first one. In the political debate in Congress, several attempts have 
been made to remove the monopolistic system of rights. However, 
these attempts have all failed, and what is most striking is that, in 
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addition to the lobbying opposition of the companies involved, 
these initiatives have also had to face the opposition of 
associations of patients suffering from rare diseases, fearful of the 
introduction of measures that could jeopardise a system that has, 
all things considered, produced useful results. They argue that 
companies are willing to invest in this sector due to the 
opportunities for making significant profits, but if exclusive rights 
were eliminated, they would stop trying to treat rare diseases. It 
should also be borne in mind that there are enormous risks in this 
sector, so that for every company that makes huge profits, dozens 
of others will fail. Individual states can also have their own 
regulations, making it possible to obtain exclusive rights for 
longer periods; conversely, orphan drug classification may even 
be revoked. A case in point is a drug used to treat AIDS-related 
diseases, produced by a company based in North Carolina.  
A third case, closely related to the first two, is the “black 
box” phenomenon, namely the fact that the price of the orphan 
drug should be proportionate to covering the costs of research and 
development, but thanks to rules relating to trade confidentiality, 
this information cannot be divulged and is known only to the 
company that produces it. Controversy over the very high prices 
of orphan drugs is commonplace. The latest such dispute involves 
a drug used to treat spinal muscular atrophy; in the first year of 
treatment alone the costs amount to $750,000, and in subsequent 
years and for the rest of the patient’s life, they amount to $375,000 
per year. Insurance companies refuse to cover these expenses, 
which means that only wealthy patients can be treated; otherwise 
public funding must be used. It is true, however, that the 
pharmaceutical company has introduced ways of providing 
financial support for patients’ families and provides facilities for 
treating children. Another well-known case is the only existing 
drug for the treatment of two rare diseases (PNH, paroxysmal 
nocturnal haemoglobinuria, and AHUS, atypical haemolytic 
uremic syndrome) and costs each patient half a million dollars 
every year. On the basis of statements by university researchers 
who worked on the discovery of the drug, it is thought that 
around 80% of the research costs for this drug were covered by 
public funding and that the costs of development and 
commercialisation amount to about 1% of the sale price of the 
drug. The public system or the private insurance system can cope 
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with the huge costs. This drug brought its pharmaceutical 
company revenues of $6 billion in eight years, making it one of the 
world’s leading companies. Given the high cost, New Zealand’s 
public health system has refused to cover it, and in Canada only a 
few provinces guarantee public coverage, thus creating a problem 
of access to medicine and survival for people with these rare 
diseases. Among other things, it has been found that the annual 
price of the drug is much higher in Canada than in other 
countries.  
The fourth phenomenon, which also produces major abuse, 
is so-called ‘salami slicing’. The technique involves applying for 
exclusive marketing authorisation for an orphan drug to be used 
for a specific rare disease and then, either at the same time or 
sometime later, applying for the same authorisation for a different 
rare disease. In this way, a drug can benefit from a variety of 
monopolistic advantages that can be distributed strategically over 
time in order to obtain maximum profit and cunningly prolong 
the exclusive commercial use of the drug. 
Despite these abuses, for which the intervention of agencies 
and institutions working for the protection of competition 
between companies is required, the regulatory framework 
introduced has, in reality, produced positive results, as it has 
given a boost to research into, and industrial production of, drugs 
that pharmaceutical companies would otherwise have had no 
economic interest in producing.  
 
 
3. Comparative notes on countries outside Europe 
The second country to introduce special legislation on 
orphan drugs, with a regulation of 1993, was Japan, which is, one 
may recall, one of the most industrialised nations in the world. 
In Japan, the status of orphan drug is granted to a 
pharmaceutical when two conditions are fulfilled, namely that it is 
to be used for incurable conditions for which no alternative health 
treatments are possible, or for conditions where the effectiveness 
and reliability of the drug are excellent in comparison with others 
on the market, and secondly that the number of patients with the 
condition in Japan be under fifty thousand, i.e., four cases per 
every ten thousand individuals.  
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Orphan drug status is granted by a branch of the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare, through a subcommittee within 
the Committee for Medicinal Products, whose conclusions are 
validated by a special committee. The applicant has to provide the 
administrative authority with the following data: the estimated 
percentage of patients in proportion to the overall population, and 
non-clinical studies and findings relating to the initial clinical 
phase, as well as the way the protocol has been developed. The 
authority that grants orphan status may revoke it if the above 
conditions cease to subsist. 
The incentives that the Japanese government grants for 
research and development on orphan drugs fall into two types. 
First, they enjoy a simplified marketing authorisation procedure, 
as the law gives priority to the assessment of applications for the 
diagnosis or treatment of rare diseases. In addition, the 
Organisation for Drug Safety and Research advises 
pharmaceutical companies on the implementation of protocols 
and the preparation of approved applications. Furthermore, the 
duration of the industrial patent, which is usually six years for 
traditional drugs in Japan, is extended to ten years for orphan 
drugs, there are a number of financial incentives, including 
subsidies, such as those from the Pharmaceutical Fund for the 
reduction of side effects and the promotion of research, which 
provide financial assistance to cover part of the research and 
development costs of the orphan drug, as well as scientific work 
and consulting for development, and especially for clinical trials. 
Reimbursement of costs is available to cover fifty percent of drug 
development costs. In addition, there are tax incentives consisting 
of a six percent reduction in taxes for research and development 
expenses. Pharmaceutical companies that make a profit from the 
sale of orphan drugs must return part of the subsidies received as 
a contribution to the preservation of this kind of aid.  
Australia has moved in a different direction since 1997-98, 
when it entered into an agreement with the United States for the 
exchange of information on rare conditions and orphan drugs. The 
Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) signed an 
agreement with the US FDA, whereby the former transposes the 
provisions of the latter, incorporating them into its evaluation 
process. Specifically, criteria were established for the recognition 
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and evaluation of drugs not yet screened by the U.S. authorities or 
that do not meet the criteria established for the United States. 
In Australia, the status of “orphan” was initially granted 
less easily than in other countries, being reserved for drugs to be 
used for treating conditions afflicting less than 1.2 cases per ten 
thousand and less than two thousand cases among the total 
population. New regulations came into force in 2017-2018, 
introducing amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Regulation of 
1990 and providing for a limit of fewer than five cases per ten 
thousand individuals, a threshold closer to those found in other 
major industrialised countries. 
Orphan drug status is valid for six months, and an 
extension may be requested every six months in order to keep the 
administrative offices up to date. This status entitles the holder to 
fiscal advantages (the TGA waivers dues for applying for 
marketing authorisation and the annual registration fee). There 
are also financial perks (the TGA covers the costs of the process of 
designating a drug as orphan, compensating for the costs incurred 
via other items in the health budget), as well as privileged patent 
rights (the monopoly lasts five years). 
Among non-European countries, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan have also adopted specific regulations for orphan 
drugs. There is an enormous gap between richer and more 
industrialised countries and poorer and less well-equipped ones 
in terms of health protection. Notably, no specific public policies 
on orphan drugs have been developed on the African continent. 
The situation is particularly delicate for so-called “orphan 
vaccines”, i.e. those used to treat rare infections or those with 
limited territorial impact (namely those affecting a limited 
geographical area but a very large number of people living there): 
the risk is particularly high for pharmaceutical companies, which 
would face development and research costs impossible to recover 
from product sales. If economic factors are negative, the incentive 
for a pharmaceutical company to work on an orphan vaccine may 
be dictated by non-economic motives, such as, for example, the 
decision to promote an ethical company image or else it may 
reflect a strategic choice by the company as a whole. Aid strategies 
may be implemented by richer countries or supranational bodies 
on the political level, or they may be inspired by humanitarian 
concerns through private donations, and they often work together. 
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For this, however, there is no supranational organisation to 
shoulder the task of coordinating the various policies in such a 
way as to concentrate energies on achieving the most important 
goals. 
 
 
4. Orphan drugs in European legislation 
European Orphan drug regulation came about almost 20 
years after U.S. regulation and was clearly inspired by it. The 
recognition of orphan drug designation takes place through an 
administrative procedure governed by European Regulation No. 
141/2000, which involves the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
and the Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP), 
established within it24. 
Indeed, in order to qualify a medicine as “orphan”, the 
sponsor (almost always the manufacturer) applies to European 
Medicines Agency at each stage of the drug development process 
(but still prior to marketing authorisation). After an initial 
assessment of the admissibility of the application, the Agency 
sends a summary report to the Committee for Orphan Medicinal 
Products, which must reach an opinion on the recognition or 
otherwise of the designation of the drug as “orphan” within 
ninety days of receipt of the application. This opinion is then sent 
to the European Commission, which adopts a decision recognising 
the designation or rejecting the application within 30 days of 
receipt. 
Under Article 8 of the Regulation, “the Community and the 
Member States shall not, for a period of 10 years, accept another 
application for a marketing authorization or grant a marketing 
authorisation or accept an application to extend an existing 
marketing authorisation for the same therapeutic indications in 
respect of a similar medicinal product with for a period of ten 
                                                   
24 As stated in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000, the Committee is 
composed of one member appointed by each Member State, three members 
appointed by the European Commission to represent patients’ organisations, 
and three members appointed by the Commission on the basis of the Agency’s 
recommendations. The term of office lasts three years and is renewable. 
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years”25. This will ensure that the orphan medicinal product will 
have exclusive production for a period of one decade. 
Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 requires certain types of 
medicinal products, including orphans, to be subject to a 
“centralised” procedure in order to obtain marketing 
authorisation. 
This procedure is carried out by the EMA through its 
Committee for Human Medicinal Products (CHMP). The 
Committee, after scientific assessment of the documentation 
submitted by the applicant, issues an opinion which is then 
forwarded to the European Commission. The Commission then 
adopts a decision that becomes binding on all Member States. The 
centralised procedure must be completed within two-hundred-
and-ten days.  
In Italy, the European Assessment Office plays an 
important role with regard to medicines authorised through the 
centralised procedure. It works through the AIFA, which carries 
out a scientific assessment of the dossiers of innovative medicinal 
products of high technological value. 
This office classifies these drugs in a special section 
dedicated to pharmaceuticals that have not yet been assessed for 
reimbursement [class C(nn)], issuing a resolution of transposition 
to that effect. This class, established by Law No. 189/2012, can be 
considered provisional and includes drugs not yet assessed for 
reimbursement. 
EC Regulation No. 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products 
now made it possible for companies manufacturing these products 
to request a prior opinion from the EMA on the various tests and 
trials necessary to demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of 
the drug; the Regulation also provides for the establishment of a 
procedure for the development of orphan drugs, consisting of 
                                                   
25 Before applying for marketing authorisation, the sponsor of an orphan 
medicinal product may request an opinion from the Agency on the 
performance of the various tests and trials necessary to demonstrate the quality, 
safety and efficacy of the medicinal product under Article 51(j) of Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2309/93. 2. The Agency establishes a procedure for the development 
of orphan medicinal products, including normative consulting to define the 
content of the application for authorisation in accordance with Article 6 of 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93. 
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regulatory advice from the Agency regarding the definition of the 
content of the application for authorisation. 
Furthermore, on the basis of this Regulation, European 
Union – and consequently the Member States – undertake not to 
grant or accept other marketing authorisations for similar 
medicinal products with the same therapeutic indications for a 
period of ten years, thereby guaranteeing a period of protection. 
In order to encourage the production of orphan medicinal 
products, the European Union has made it possible, for certain 
categories of medicinal products responding to unmet medical 
needs, to grant marketing authorisation more quickly, based on 
data less complete than those normally required. For this, there 
exist a conditional marketing authorisation and a marketing 
authorisation granted in exceptional circumstances. 
In order to strike the right balance between reducing the 
time needed to access medicinal products and authorisation for 
medicinal products based on an unfavourable risk-benefit balance, 
it is necessary to subject these marketing authorisations to specific 
obligations. The holder should complete or undertake certain 
studies to confirm that the risk-benefit balance is favourable and 
to resolve any doubts regarding the quality, safety, and efficacy of 
the product. 
Conditional authorisation, governed by Regulation (EC) 
No. 507/200626, consists of the rapid approval of a drug on the 
basis of less complete clinical data than those generally required. 
This form of authorisation may be required for a medicinal 
product intended for an unmet medical need, a seriously life-
                                                   
26 According to point 2 of the Preamble to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
507/2006 on a conditional marketing authorisation for medicinal products for 
human use falling within the scope of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004, “In the 
case of certain categories of medicinal products, however, in order to meet 
unmet medical needs of patients and in the interests of public health, it may be 
necessary to grant marketing authorisations on the basis of less complete data 
than is normally the case and subject to specific obligations, hereinafter 
conditional marketing authorisations. And, according to point 6 of the 
Preamble, In the case of the conditional marketing authorisation, authorisation 
is granted before all data are available. The authorisation is not intended, 
however, to remain conditional indefinitely. Rather, once the missing data are 
provided, it should be possible to replace it with a marketing authorisation 
which is not conditional, that is to say, which is not subject to specific 
obligations”.  
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threatening or disabling condition, a rare disease, or for use in 
emergency situations in response to a threat to public health.  
Conditional marketing authorisation may be issued if the 
Committee considers that, although full clinical data on the safety 
and efficacy of the medicinal product have not been provided, the 
risk-benefit balance of the medicinal product is nevertheless 
respected, it is likely that the applicant will be able to provide full 
clinical data at a later date, that the medicinal product is intended 
to meet unmet medical needs, and that the public health benefits 
deriving from the immediate availability on the market of the 
medicinal product in question outweigh the risk arising from the 
fact that additional data are still needed. 
This authorisation is valid for one year and may be 
renewed. The company developing the drug is required to 
conduct further studies to provide complete data so that the 
conditional authorisation can be converted into a standard one. 
Authorisation is granted in urgent circumstances and may be 
granted on condition that the applicant puts mechanisms on the 
safety of the medicinal product in place and informs the 
competent authorities of any drawbacks related to the use of the 
product. 
Conditional authorisation issued in exceptional 
circumstances, generally meaning extremely rare diseases27, is 
different from conditioned marketing authorisation. Both 
procedures are laid down in Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No. 
726/2004, (7) and (8) respectively. However, while conditional 
marketing authorisation is issued before all the data are available, 
and will subsequently be supplemented by the missing data, it 
                                                   
27 Article 14(7) of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 laying down Community 
procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for 
human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, 
which provides that “Following consultation with the applicant, an 
authorisation maybe granted subject to certain specific obligations, to be 
reviewed annually by the Agency. The list of these obligations shall be made 
publicly accessible. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, such authorisation 
shall be valid for one year, on a renewable basis. The Commission shall adopt a 
Regulation laying down provisions for granting such authorisation. That 
measure, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by 
supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny referred to in Article 87 (2a)”.  
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will never be possible, in principle, to compile a complete dossier 
for marketing authorisation issued in exceptional circumstances. 
 
 
5. Italian regulation 
In Italy, the European tendency to facilitate rapid entry 
onto the market of the drug and, therefore, simplified access to 
orphan drugs, is confirmed28. Law no. 189/2012 made it possible 
for a pharmaceutical company to apply to the AIFA for pricing 
and reimbursement immediately after the issue of the CHMP’s 
positive opinion and therefore even before the European 
Commission has issued a Community authorisation to market the 
drug. This exception to the normal procedure is not only reserved 
to orphan drugs but also those that can only be used in a hospital 
environment and drugs of exceptional therapeutic importance. 
With subsequent Law No. 98/2013, the AIFA was assigned the 
task of assessing orphan drugs of exceptional therapeutic 
importance as a matter of priority, with a maximum evaluation 
time of one-hundred days (so-called “fast track” authorisation)29.  
                                                   
28 For an overview of the regulation of drugs in Italy, see, ex multis, M. Gnes, 
Farmaci, in M.P. Chiti, G. Greco (eds.), in Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo, 
Parte speciale, (2007), 1075-1111; C. Casonato, I farmaci, fra speculazioni e logiche 
costituzionali, in 4 Rivista AIC 1 (2017); about the legal regulation of orphan 
drugs in Italy, see, among others, F. Ficicchia, Malattie rare e farmaci orfani. Profili 
giuridici,  in 4 Contratto e impresa. Europa 428, 458 (2007); F. 
Massimino, Qualifica di “medicinale orfano”: condizioni per l’assegnazione e 
giurisprudenza del Tribunale di primo grado, in 1 Diritto pubblico comparato ed 
europeo 167, 171 (2011); A. Magni, I c.d. “diritti della personalità”, il diritto alla 
salute e le c.d. “malattie rare” nell’ordinamento Italo-europeo, in 5-6 Il Diritto di 
famiglia e delle persone 1152, 1164 (2016); A. Parziale, Il futuro dei farmaci orfani 
tra promozione della ricerca per la cura di malattie rare e i rischi di prezzi eccessivi: il 
ruolo del diritto della concorrenza, in Contratto e impresa 1245,1277 (2016); G. 
Sena, Farmaci “orfani” e medicinali per uso pediatrico. Note critiche, in 1 Rivista di 
diritto industriale 173, 178 (2016); A. Perfetti, La tutela della salute nell’Unione 
europea attraverso l’azione nel campo delle malattie rare, in 1 DPCE online 18 (2017); 
L. Scaffardi, G. Formici, Farmaci orfani nel panorama europeo e nazionale: alla ricerca 
di un delicato equilibrio, in 1 Amministrazione in cammino 1 (2017); A. Cauduro, 
Il paradigma del farmaco orfano, in Costituzionalismo 55,70 (2018); A. Magni, Il 
diritto alla salute e la creazione di sottogruppi: riproposizione di principi attivi già 
approvati e autorizzati nell’ambito della terapia delle c.d. “malattie rare”, in 3-4 Il 
Diritto di famiglia e delle persone 305,324 (2019). 
29 Pursuant to Article 44(4-ter) of Decree Law No. 69/2013 (converted into Law 
No. 98/2013), amending Law No. 189/2012 with the introduction of Article 5-
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Products designated as “orphan medicinal products” are 
entered in a European register and, if authorised to be placed on 
the market, are eligible for a special preferential scheme designed 
to compensate the producers of any medicinal products for the 
diseconomies they have suffered and that are not offset by sales 
profits. Marketing authorisation for orphan medicinal products 
follows the same rules as any other medicinal product30. In the 
case of orphan medicinal products, however, pursuant to Article 
7(1) of (EC) Regulation No. 141/2000, the applicant may be 
exempted from the obligation to demonstrate the requirements set 
out in Annex B to (EEC) Regulation No. 2309/1993, namely that 
the medicinal product be of “major therapeutic interest” and 
constitute “a major innovation”. In the Communication from the 
Commission on the application of Articles 3, 5, and 7 of EC 
Regulation No. 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products, and in 
particular in relation to the relationship between orphan and non-
orphan medicinal products, paragraph D states that the procedure 
for designation as an orphan medicinal product and for marketing 
authorisation are “governed by different criteria, which means 
that different decisions may be taken as regards, for example, the 
condition underlying the designation and the authorised 
therapeutic indication”. 
The main benefit provided for by the European Regulation 
is that it is possible to grant the designated orphan medicinal 
product exclusive access to the market throughout Europe for a 
period of ten years31; moreover, under Article 9 of the Regulation, 
                                                                                                                            
bis, the AIFA assesses, for the purposes of classification and reimbursement by 
the National Health Service, the medicines referred to in paragraph 3, for which 
the relevant application for classification referred to in paragraph 1 has been 
submitted, accompanied by the necessary documentation as a priority and 
giving them priority over the classification proceedings pending at the date of 
submission of the application referred to in this section, including through the 
establishment of extraordinary sessions of the competent Commissions. In this 
case, the period referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4 is reduced to one 
hundred days (so-called fast track authorisation). 
30 The framework was initially contained in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2309/1993. Subsequently, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use was adopted. 
31 That market exclusivity referred to in Article 8 of EC Regulation No. 
141/2000 is not the same as patent exclusivity, which may protect the same 
product at the same time, since the European regulation is without prejudice to 
the legislation on the protection of intellectual property. On this point, see G. 
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designated orphan medicinal products “may benefit from 
incentives made available by the Community and the Member 
States in order to promote research, development and placing on 
the market”. 
Many drugs have been designated as “orphan” up to now, 
meaning they have completed the procedure to ascertain their 
necessity in the treatment of a condition considered serious and 
rare. In fact, there are over one-thousand-two-hundred of them. 
However, of the drugs that have obtained this designation, only 
slightly more than a tenth have gone on to receive marketing 
authorisation: this testifies to the level of risk associated with 
developing orphan drugs. 
Recognition of the designation of orphan drug is not the 
desired outcome of research and testing geared to treating 
previously untreated diseases. It is actually an intermediate phase, 
following the identification of a drug suitable for the treatment of 
a serious and rare condition not previously treated, but prior to 
further testing, consisting of pre-clinical and clinical studies, after 
which it will be possible to apply for marketing authorisation for 
the drug. Statistically, it is during this phase that a drastic 
reduction in the number of orphan drugs eligible to be marketed 
occurs. 
To date, just under one hundred orphan drugs have been 
authorised and reimbursed in Italy, making up 73% of those 
approved in Europe. Public health expenditure for orphan drugs 
has almost tripled in recent years, rising from six-hundred-and-
fifty-million in 2010 to one-billion-six-hundred-million in 2017. 
 
 
6. Incentive measures for pharmaceutical companies 
operating in the orphan drugs sector: comparative profiles 
Measures such as granting a temporary monopoly or 
agreeing on a high price for the orphan drug aim to encourage 
pharmaceutical companies to invest large sums in research and 
development, substantially compensating for the risk of losing the 
money invested: the research may not bear fruit (as the cure may 
not be found), or once the cure is found, it may not be recognised 
                                                                                                                            
Sena, Farmaci “orfani” e medicinali per uso pediatrico. Note critiche, in 4-5 Riv. dir. 
industr. 173 (2016). 
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as an orphan drug, or authorisation to market the drug may not be 
granted. The sector is therefore subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty. 
However, this need is hindered by the necessity of 
containing public expenditure and the need not to place an 
unlimited economic burden (inevitably growing and not wholly 
predictable) solely on the State budget and therefore on society as 
a whole. 
Within the European scenario, the measures adopted by the 
individual States to compensate for the greater economic burden 
placed on them by the process of research and development 
related to medicines for rare diseases are diversified. Examining 
the regulations adopted in the various European countries to 
implement Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000, we can distinguish 
between measures that constitute incentives and funding for 
research (Cyprus, Poland, Spain), the provision of dedicated funds 
for spending on orphan drugs (Croatia), reimbursement measures 
from public funds (Estonia, Greece, Poland) or through the 
insurance system (Germany, Slovakia), tax exemptions for 
companies producing orphan drugs (France), and the joint 
negotiation of pricing by pharmaceutical companies and the State 
(Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg)32. 
As mentioned above, in the United States, the ODA 
introduced a series of tax reliefs for pharmaceutical companies 
and various forms of incentives (e.g., research funding or covering 
the costs of experimentation and development), as well as forms 
of temporary market monopoly (lasting seven years) provided for 
by law and authorised by the FDA.  
All these mechanisms confirm the need to guarantee that 
the economic operators working in this sector receive some form 
of support regardless of the market dynamics in order to 
guarantee patients suffering from rare diseases their right to 
health. 
The solution adopted in Italian legal system is based, on the 
other hand, on a payback principle, i.e. the distribution of costs 
among pharmaceutical companies when they exceed the budget 
                                                   
32 Please refer to 2015 European Commission document, “Inventory of Union 
and Member State incentives to support research into, and development and 
availability of, orphan medicinal products”, SWD (2015) 13 final. 
SANDULLI – ORPHAN DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES 
504 
 
allocated to the national health fund by the State. On the other 
hand, this mechanism, which is applied in general to all annual 
pharmaceutical costs, contains a special provision reserved for 
pharmaceutical expenditure for orphan drugs for hospital use, 
which far exceeds that for prescription use.  
This figure, despite contributing to the total national 
pharmaceutical expenditure, remains distinct from it for the 
purposes of distributing the associated costs, as any figure 
exceeding the State coverage ceiling is distributed only among 
pharmaceutical companies that do not produce orphan drugs (or 
in proportion to the turnover for non-orphan drugs in the case of 
companies that produce both types of drugs). 
Before describing the mechanism adopted for orphan drugs 
in Italy, it is necessary to briefly illustrate the essential features of 
pharmaceutical expenditure coverage. 
 
 
7. The pharmaceutical expenditure coverage mechanism 
in Italy 
From a reading of the sources that regulate the national 
pharmaceutical expenditure coverage mechanism, it is clear that 
the legislator’s aim is clearly to “guarantee the balance of the 
public purse”33, and “efficiency in the use of resources allocated to 
the health sector”34, given the strategic importance of the 
pharmaceutical sector to the country’s industrial and innovation 
objectives and the contribution this sector makes to health goals in 
the provision of essential levels of care35. 
To do so, national and hospital pharmaceutical costs are 
borne by the State up to a pre-established percentage calculated by 
referring to the National Healthcare Requirement (NHR)36 forecast 
                                                   
33 See Article 21 (2) of Decree Law No. 113/2016. 
34 See Article 15 (1) of Decree Law No. 95/2012. 
35 See Article 21 (l) of Decree Law No. 113/2016. 
36 The National Health Requirement is the overall amount of resources of the 
National Health Service (NHS) to whose funding the State contributes and is 
established by law on an annual basis. Pursuant to Article 12 of Decree Law No. 
502/1992, the Fondo Sanitario Nazionale di parte corrente e in conto capitale 
(National Health Fund for current and capital contributions) is entirely financed 
by State funds, and is established annually by the Finance Act on the basis of 
the presumed total amount of sickness contributions allocated to the Regions 
that year. 
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for the year of reference. The legislator has changed the 
percentage of State coverage over the years without prejudice to 
the different ceilings of coverage for national pharmaceutical and 
hospital pharmaceutical expenditure. 
National pharmaceutical expenditure37 (now “prescription” 
expenditure) includes pharmaceuticals supplied according to the 
rules for prescription medicines but not that for A-class 
pharmaceuticals supplied directly38. 
For this expenditure, the National Health Service 
guarantees coverage of costs up to a legally established 
percentage, which is currently equal to 7.96%39 of the National 
Health Fund, corresponding to an amount annually quantified by 
the Ministry of Health40. If this ceiling is exceeded, coverage for 
the overspend is distributed among the pharmaceutical companies 
with marketing authorisations for class A pharmaceuticals in 
proportion to their turnover, as well as among wholesalers and 
                                                   
37 Total national pharmaceutical expenditure is determined on the basis of data 
sent monthly by the Regions to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the AIFA, 
and the Ministry of Health. 
38 See Article 5 (1) of Decree Law No. 159/2007. Pursuant to Article 5(2)d, and 
Law No. 222 of 29 November 2007, the parameter for monitoring 
pharmaceutical expenditure under the agreement is the Osmed flow 
established under Article 68 (9) of Law No. 448 of 23 December 1998, while 
expenditure for the direct distribution of class A medicines, including 
distribution upon hospital discharge is recorded on the basis of the flow 
established pursuant to Ministerial Decree of 31 July 2007 (“Information flow 
regarding pharmaceutical services provided through direct distribution”). 
39 Article 1 (399) of Law No. 232/2016. The legislator has reduced the 
percentage several times over the last three decades, going from 16% per 
Region in 2004 (Article 48, Decree Law No. 269/2003) to 14% in 2008 (Article 
5(1), Decree Law No. 195/2007), to 13.6% for 2009 (Decree Law No. 232/2016). 
Decree Law No. 39/2009, converted into Law No. 77/2009), 13.3% for 2010 
(Decree Law No. 78/2009 converted into Law No. 102/2009), 13.1% for 2012 
(Article 15(2), Decree Law No. 95/2012, converted into Law No. 135/2012), 
11.35% provided for in Article 15(3), Decree Law No. 95/2012. 
40 Pursuant to Article 5(1) of Decree Law No. 159/2007, the absolute value of the 
burden on the National Health Service for the aforementioned pharmaceutical 
assistance, both at national level and in each individual Region, is to be 
established annually by the Ministry of Health by 15th November of the year 
preceding the year of reference on the basis of the allocation of financial 
resources to the National Health Service approved by the CIPE, or on the basis 
of the allocation proposed by the Ministry of Health, to be formulated by 15 
October. 
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pharmacies that have supplied pharmaceuticals in category A, this 
time in proportion to the share of the retail prices of the products 
that they earn41. 
Hospital pharmaceutical expenditure42 (now called “direct 
purchases”) is calculated on the basis of the total pharmaceutical 
expenditure excluding prescription medicines, vaccine costs, 
paramedicines, officinal preparations for hospital pharmacies, and 
foreign medicines43, but including class A medicines distributed 
directly or on behalf of the company. 
Coverage guaranteed by the National Health Service 
currently makes up 6.89% of the National Health Fund44. If this 
state coverage ceiling is exceeded, 50% of the surplus hospital 
pharmaceutical coverage is distributed to the Regions where the 
expenditure ceiling has been exceeded, in proportion to their 
respective deficits, and 50% to the pharmaceutical companies with 
marketing authorisation for class H45 medicines purchased by 
public health facilities. 
For both expenditure flows under discussion, the “ceilings” 
for State coverage are essentially defined on the basis of previous 
expenditure calculated for pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical 
companies and subject to annual adjustments by the legislator and 
the administrative authority. 
Article 21 of Law No. 113/2016, converted into Law No. 
160/2016, regulates the mechanism for covering hospital and 
territorial pharmaceutical expenditure in excess of State coverage 
ceilings, establishing a special mechanism for the years 2013-2014-
2015 and 2016, in part overlapping with the provisions of Article 5 
                                                   
41 See Article 5 (3)(a) of Law No. 222/2007. For the share of overspend borne by 
the distribution chain, the AIFA can establish the percentage of discount on 
sales made in the six months following the effective date of the redistribution 
measure that will allow the National Health Service to recover the value of the 
redistribution among pharmacists and wholesalers. 
42 This expenditure is calculated from the flow established in accordance with 
the Ministerial Decree of 31 July 2007. 
43 This percentage has seen a significant increase over time, since Article 5(5) of 
Decree Law No. 159/2007 established a coverage of 2.4%, and Article 15 of 
Decree Law No. 95/2012 established coverage of 3.5%. 
44 Article 1 (1)1 398, of  Law No. 232/1016. 
45 These are medicines reimbursable by the National Health Service when used 
in hospitals or similar facilities according to the provisions of the Regions or 
autonomous provinces, as defined in the AIFA Resolution of July 25, 2005. 
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of Decree Law No. 159/2007. In summary, after provisional 
quantification of the portion of coverage due to each 
pharmaceutical company with a medicine marketing 
authorisation, the AIFA46 approves the final document for 
monitoring pharmaceutical expenditure, where it ascertains 
whether the National Health Service has exceeded the ceiling and 
calculates the final shares of coverage to be distributed among the 
pharmaceutical companies. In addition, the amount of coverage 
paid by the pharmaceutical companies the previous year is 
subtracted from the annual coverage budget, further reducing the 
margins of expenditure borne by the State. 
 
 
8. Pharmaceutical expenditure coverage for orphan drugs 
This regulatory framework contains a special regulation for 
expenditure on innovative and orphan drugs. 
In the case of innovative drugs47, pursuant to Article 
15(8)(b), Decree Law No. 95/2012, a dedicated guarantee fund was 
established, details of which are established on a year by year 
basis48. Only when pharmaceutical expenditure attributable to 
innovative medicines exceeds the amount of the fund does it 
                                                   
46 The procedure involves pharmaceutical companies, companies specialised in 
the distribution of medicines, and trade associations, with which the AIFA 
provides data from two separate information flows: the OSMED data flow for 
national pharmaceutical expenditure, and data from the New Health 
Information System of the Ministry of Health for hospital pharmaceutical 
expenditure. They are entitled to submit a request for the data to be rectified 
before the final measure approving the amounts of coverage for pharmaceutical 
expenditure is ratified. 
47 These drugs are identified on the basis of three parameters: therapeutic need, 
added therapeutic value, and the quality of evidence or the robustness of 
clinical studies. Therapeutic need depends on the existence of therapies for the 
condition in question and indicates the extent to which the new therapy can 
give new answers to existing therapeutic needs; added therapeutic value is 
determined by the extent of clinical benefit brought by the new drug in 
comparison with the alternatives available, if any; the quality of the evidence is 
given by the scientific excellence of the elements produced to support 
innovation. The innovativeness of a drug is recognised by AIFA. 
48 The allocation for the years 2015 and 2016 was quantified by Law No. 
190/2014. 
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contribute to reaching the overall pharmaceutical expenditure 
ceiling49. 
From 2016, national pharmaceutical coverage for innovative 
medicines is distributed equally among the pharmaceutical 
companies authorised to market the same innovative medicine 
and the other companies in proportion to their respective turnover 
for non-innovative medicines covered by a patent (see Article 
5(3)(a), Decree Law No. 159/2007). 
As for orphan drugs, hospital pharmaceutical expenditure 
in excess of the state coverage ceiling is covered by all companies 
holding marketing authorisation in proportion to their respective 
turnovers for non-orphan and non-innovative medicines covered 
by patent (see Article 21(15) Decree Law No. 113/2016)50. 
                                                   
49 Pursuant to Article 1(569) of Law No. 208/2015, “in order to allow the proper 
administration of innovative drugs in compliance with the planned financial 
framework for the national health service and in relation to measures to 
improve the efficiency of the health sector (...) for the years 2015 and 2016, 
expenditure for the purchase of innovative drugs contributes to reaching the 
ceiling for territorial pharmaceutical assistance as per Article 15 (3) of Decree 
Law No. 95/2012, converted into Law No. 135/2012 for the amount exceeding 
the amount of the fund referred to in Article 1(593) of Law No. 190/2014 for 
each of the years 2015 and 2016. Article 21 (15) of Decree Law No. 113/2016 
establishes that the AIFA also determines the coverage of the portion of the 
amount beyond the ceiling of hospital pharmaceutical expenditure attributable 
to innovative drugs not complying with the ceiling of the specific fund referred 
to in Article 15(8)(b) of Decree Law No. 95/2012”, “distributing it among all the 
companies with marketing authorisation in proportion to their turnover for 
non-orphaned and non-innovative medicines covered by patent. Within the 
same period, the AIFA shall also establish the amount of coverage of the portion 
in excess of the national pharmaceutical expenditure ceiling attributable to the 
overrun of the specific fund referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, letter a) of 
Decree Law No. 159/2007 by innovative medicines, distributing it among all 
companies with marketing authorisation in proportion to their respective 
turnover for non-innovative medicines covered by patents”. 
50 The exception for orphan drugs is provided for in Article 15(8) i) and i-bis), 
Decree Law No. 95/2012, referred to in Article 21(15) of Decree Law No. 
113/2016. The explanatory report to Decree Law No. 95/2012, states that “On 
the basis of current legislation (Article 17(1)(b), Legislative Decree No. 98/2011) 
the expenditure ceiling for hospital pharmaceuticals amounts to 2.4 per cent 
and a payback to be paid by pharmaceutical companies if the ceiling is 
exceeded, equal to 35% of the overspend. The provisions in question replace the 
provisions of Article 17 (1) (b) in full, recalculating the expenditure ceiling from 
2.4% to 3.2%, increasing the percentage of payback from 35% to 50% and 
excluding certain drugs (vaccines, class C and C-a drugs, foreign drugs, etc.) 
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In recent years, developments in scientific knowledge, 
technological equipment (also in the field of medicine), and 
innovation in research have led to increased levels of health 
protection and the production and commercialisation of 
increasingly advanced, effective, and safe drugs, which have, 
however, contributed to increased annual pharmaceutical 
expenditure and a consequent burden on pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Consequently, there has also been a gradual increase in 
expenditure beyond the state coverage ceiling subject to the 
coverage mechanism: from 2013 to 2016, overspend has risen from 
11% to 29% of total expenditure. These percentages include both 
expenditure for orphan drugs and other types of drugs subject to 
payback. Concerning orphan drugs, as shown by the 2015 Osmed 
report, expenditure has risen from €657 million in 2010 (equal to 
3.5% of total pharmaceutical expenditure) to €1,393 million in 2016 
(or 6.1% of total expenditure) in just five years. 
This growth trend might well call for a fresh look at the 
balance found so far between protecting the health of patients 
with rare conditions and safeguarding the freedom of 
pharmaceutical companies required to bear the burden of 
coverage for them, in order to offset the growing burdens they 
have to face. For this reason too, it is particularly important to 
check the ability of a regulatory model drawn up in circumstances 
in part different from the current scenario to resist in time, 
checking whether the balance found by the legislator between the 
different constitutional rights involved is affected by new 
conditions on the reference market, or if it remains valid 
regardless of external variables. 
In this regard, it is first necessary to examine what makes 
the regulatory framework special, and which solutions thus result 
unsatisfactory. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
from the parameters for calculating the level of expenditure. Moreover, 50% of 
any excess in respect of the ceiling must be paid to the regional authority in 
proportion to the share of access to their health requirements”. 
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9. The need to contain public health expenditure and the 
right to health of patients suffering from rare diseases 
There is a very close correlation between the possibility of 
satisfying the right to health of patients suffering from serious and 
less common conditions and the possibility, for the 
pharmaceutical companies that produce them, of administering 
them. When a new orphan drug is placed on the market, a certain 
number of people suffering from a rare disease (in most cases, 
between a few dozen and a few hundred, in a country with a 
population like that of Italy) have prospects of treatment and 
recovery for the first time. 
This means that every orphan drug placed on the market 
corresponds to an increase in demand and expenditure, as the 
demand has so far been devoid of adequate supply. However, this 
increase in expenditure is not, in this case, an exceptional or 
anomalous circumstance. In some sense, it is the real purpose of 
the work of the companies working in the sector, namely that their 
research leads to the identification of a drug able to treat 
conditions that could not be treated before. Newly introduced 
orphan drugs are therefore added over time to those already on 
the market and for which expenditure remains almost constant 
over time (as rare conditions are normally chronic), necessarily 
leading to an overall increase in pharmaceutical expenditure. As 
for orphan drugs, a gradual increase in expenditure is therefore an 
inevitable (and in a sense desirable) consequence of the research 
being carried out in this sector, which leads to the discovery of 
new forms of treatment that did not exist before. 
On the other hand, this does not happen with common 
drugs, because the commercialisation of a new drug on a 
competitive market determines (or may determine) a shift in 
preference from drugs already on the market to the new one, with 
no change in overall spending (the over-budget resulting from the 
purchase of the new drug is compensated for by the under-budget 
resulting from abandoning old drugs). 
If we neglect what has been said so far, with regard to the 
need to contain public expenditure it might be said that the main 
cause of exceeding State budgeting for coverage lies with orphan 
drugs, so intervention is needed in order to ensure a constant 
balance between the opposing needs of public finance and health 
protection. However, this would mean ignoring the fact that 
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increased expenditure in this sector is non-reducible and 
completely predictable characteristic rather than a disaster to be 
corrected. Conversely, limiting pharmaceutical expenditure for 
orphan drugs would mean a reducing research activity on new 
orphan drugs, i.e., a limitation of the right of people with rare 
conditions to receive, or at least hope to receive, adequate 
treatment like anyone else suffering from common illnesses for 
which drugs are available. 
The characteristics described so far make it impossible to 
apply the same methods of coverage of pharmaceutical 
expenditure envisaged for normal drugs to orphan drugs. 
Article 21 (7), of Decree Law No. 113/2016 states that the 
AIFA has to allocate a portion of coverage to each pharmaceutical 
company considering all the products that the company is 
authorised to place on the market. This quota is calculated “on the 
basis of the turnover for the year prior to the year reference for 
each pharmaceutical company, increased or decreased according 
to the percentage variation between the figure established as the 
pharmaceutical expenditure ceiling of the year when the quota 
was allocated and the pharmaceutical expenditure resulting from 
the documentation produced for the previous year”. 
In the case of orphan drugs, this method of calculating 
coverage is not applicable. Firstly, in the case of orphan medicinal 
products, setting an expenditure ceiling or laying the burden of 
overspend costs on the manufacturers themselves would simply 
discourage the development and commercialisation of orphan 
medicinal products, thus going against the provisions of the 
European regulations and Italian legislation. Secondly, in the case 
of orphan drugs, it is not possible to take previous pharmaceutical 
expenditure as a benchmark for calculating the share of coverage 
to allocate, as the demand for existing orphan drugs (generally 
used to treat chronic diseases) is supplemented each year by the 
demand coming from newly diagnosed patients and for newly 
marketed orphan drugs, which is satisfied for the first time, 
implying a steady increase in expenditure. 
Thirdly, it should be remarked that the minute number of 
patients leads to discernible market variability for each orphan 
drug, because the addition or loss of even one patient can result in 
very high fluctuations in sales history. For this reason, it is 
particularly difficult to make expenditure forecasts for the 
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purpose of allocating suitable funds. Similarly, it is impossible to 
calculate coverage by considering the percentage variation 
between the figure established for the pharmaceutical expenditure 
ceiling in the year of allocation of the quota and the 
pharmaceutical expenditure resulting from the documentation 
produced for the previous year. 
Lastly, even if the company were to comply with cost 
constraints, this would be tantamount to placing a limit on the 
number of patients suffering from rare diseases to be treated in the 
absence of an alternative offer to make up for the failure to supply 
the orphan drug. In the case of ordinary pharmaceutical supplies, 
given that there is usually competition between different 
manufacturers, should a company that has reached its budget not 
wish to supply a certain drug to the very end, other operators can 
step in. This is does not happen with orphan drugs, where market 
exclusivity normally means that only one company producing a 
given drug is registered. It follows, therefore, that once its budget 
is reached, an orphan drug marketing authorisation holder would 
have no economic reason to continue to accept orders. Supply 
would then only be ensured if a pharmaceutical company 
voluntarily gave up its own profit (for ethical reasons), apart from 
an imposed financial obligation. Both solutions are, however, 
impossible: the first one because the protection of the right to 
health of citizens cannot be left to the liberal concession of a 
private entrepreneur, and the second because it is incompatible 
with the Italian legal and constitutional system51. 
It should also be pointed out that from a quantitative and 
statistical point of view, the growing economic burden on 
pharmaceutical companies subject to the coverage mechanism is 
due to an increase in pharmaceutical expenditure across the 
board, not only in respect of orphan drugs, which continue to 
represent a rather low percentage. For the same reason, the 
onerousness of the payback mechanism imposed on companies 
                                                   
51 On the subject of the regulation of payback see T.A.R. Lazio, Rome, Sec. III-
quater, No. 6173/2015, “Naturally, for the sake of the constitutionality of the 
entire system, in no way – once a supply contract has been entered into – can a 
company be obliged to provide a service of indefinite content or, in any case, 
liable to exceed the limits contractually laid down thereto as that this would 
result in an imposed service going against the limits mechanism for hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure established by the legislator”. 
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would not anyway be reduced if the special regulations were 
eliminated and the general criterion for the coverage of hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure were extended to orphan drugs. 
Assessing the possible impact of a possible extension of the 
payback system currently applied to hospital pharmaceutical 
expenditure for orphan drugs to orphan drug manufacturers, on 
the basis of the documents made available by a company and 
based on data from 2013 (the last officially available), it can be 
assumed that the median figure52 would be as follows: companies 
should return 12% of their turnover, a very high percentage in 
comparison with the average payback levels for other 
pharmaceutical companies, which are much lower. It would also 
be not uncommon for companies to be required to pay more than 
25% of their revenues. It is clear that such a mechanism would act 
as a disincentive to the production of new orphan drugs and, for 
companies already on the market, would prevent the treatment of 
a greater number of patients.  
It follows therefore that the coverage mechanism for 
ordinary pharmaceutical expenditure requires different corrective 
measures than those in place for the coverage of orphan drug 
expenditure. The mechanism adopted by the Italian legal system 
requires that, once the ceiling for coverage by the State has been 
exceeded, hospital expenditure must be covered jointly by the 
pharmaceutical companies that produce non-patented non-orphan 
drugs, which are therefore not damaged, for the reasons 
mentioned above, by the fluidity of the market and the 
unpredictability of research costs and profits. 
It is therefore necessary to verify whether the constitutional 
bases for this form of regulation are able to guarantee its 
continuity over time, regardless of any change in real-world 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
52 The “median” value rather than the “mean” value is used, since it is more 
suitable for intervals with a wide dispersion of values. If payback were applied 
to orphan drug manufacturers, around two thirds of them would be affected. 
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10. The non-reducible core of the right to health in the 
case law of the Constitutional Court 
The rationale of the current regulation on orphan drugs has 
been analysed above. Specifically, it emerges that the exemption of 
this category of drugs (and the companies that produce them) 
from certain mechanisms for the containment of public health 
expenditure (especially “payback”) is the prerequisite for 
allowing, on the one hand, future patients suffering from rare 
conditions, for whom adequate drugs are already available, to 
receive assistance on a par with those already receiving treatment 
without the risk of being subjected to limitations or quotas. On the 
other hand, it would allow research institutions and 
pharmaceutical companies to continue developing scientific 
research on rare conditions still deemed incurable or not 
adequately treatable, so that new and useful drugs may be 
developed. 
Having ascertained the usefulness of the current legislative 
framework, it is also necessary to verify its constitutional 
necessity, necessarily following two trajectories. First of all, it must 
be ascertained whether there is any obligation (unavailable, in 
theory, even from the legislator), on the part of the National 
Health System as a whole, to endow companies holding 
marketing authorisation with the sums negotiated with no ceiling 
for orphan drugs. 
Secondly, it needs to be considered whether the resulting 
burden must be borne by the public sector or may continue to be 
borne – as the law currently stands – by other private economic 
operators and, if so, within which limits. The first problem will be 
addressed in this section and the second question in the next one.  
It must be recognised that, where the issue is considered 
solely from the point of view of the companies that market orphan 
drugs and the interest of which they are the bearers, it is difficult 
to establish any non-reducible right on their part not to have to 
face – in absolute terms – reductions in their revenues. 
For reasons that (for a different purpose) will be discussed 
in the next section, in the “administered market” of medicines, 
neither the principle of freedom of economic enterprise protected 
by Article No. 41 of the Constitution nor the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations, deriving from Article No. 3 
of the Constitution, absolutely prohibit the legislator from 
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impinging on the expected profit margins of pharmaceutical 
companies, naturally within the limits of reasonableness. On the 
subject of obligatory discounts on the prices of drugs reimbursed 
by the national health service, suffice it to quote a judgment 
handed down by the Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 
279/2006,  according to which, the sphere of private autonomy 
does not receive absolute protection from the legal system, so any 
disputed constraint in the determination of price is not 
constitutionally illegitimate when it proves to have been wrought 
to allow the simultaneous satisfaction of a plurality of 
constitutionally significant interests. 
However, in the subject matter presented, a number of 
conclusions may be reached, considering the impact of possible 
changes to the current legislative framework for orphan drugs on 
citizens’ health. Indeed, for the reasons set out above, the main 
negative effect of the possible application of spending caps in 
connection with rare conditions would seem to be that it would 
jeopardise the system of production or distribution of effective 
drugs for all those in need of them (see also below). 
This connection, however, is not a mere de facto 
consequence of a legislative amendment (as such constitutionally 
irrelevant), but would be a direct effect and an immediate 
corollary of it. Moreover, this connection was positively and 
expressly acknowledged in parliament and was the main and 
declared reason, during the law-making process, for exempting 
orphan drugs from payback, especially when the Stability Law for 
the year 2014 was adopted, which makes it possible to discount 
one argument that draws on the case law of the Constitutional 
Court on the subject.  
Quite recently, with a Judgment of 2006 (No. 203/2006), the 
Constitutional Court rejected the possibility that Article 32 of the 
Constitution (on the right to health) might represent a ground for 
challenging a legislative measure that did not aim directly to 
regulate the treatment rights of patients, but rather concerned the 
economic operators of the national health service. In this case, it 
concerned legislative measures for the “reduction of the outlay 
and corresponding volumes of purchase” by private bodies 
authorised to provide care services). However, the Court based its 
decision on a precise factual supposition, namely that “there is no 
evidence that the right to health of citizens is affected by the rule” 
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(since the benefits can be provided in other ways). In the case of 
orphan drugs, on the other hand, the direct impact on the 
consideration payable is expressly acknowledged by the legislator 
itself. 
Having clarified this point, one can consider the obligations 
arising from Article No. 32 of Constitution with regard to the right 
to health and, more specifically, the right to health care. The 
question has been the subject of numerous rulings by the 
Constitutional Court and the Courts of Legitimacy in the most 
general terms and has been amply addressed in the legal 
literature. 
However, some preliminary caveats are also in order. Not 
even the right to health, like any other right to protection by the 
State, can be wholly exempt from balancing with other principles 
and requirements of constitutional rank, especially to the ends 
now of greatest interest, with restrictions of a financial nature 
under Article No. 81 of the Constitution. In the light of the scarcity 
of resources or, at any rate, of available ones, the allocation of one 
subsidy may prove incompatible with another, even if equally 
worthy of protection and consideration. 
Hence the principle repeatedly reaffirmed by the 
Constitutional Court, that “health protection cannot but be 
affected by the circumstances that the legislator itself encounters 
in distributing the financial resources available to it” 
(Constitutional Court Judgment No. 203/2016). It follows that, in 
general, the right to health care “is guaranteed to every person as 
a constitutional right conditioned by the implementation that the 
legislator works through the balancing of the interest protected by 
that right against other constitutionally protected interests, 
bearing in mind the objective limits that the legislator encounters 
in relation to the organisational and financial resources available 
to it at a given moment” (consolidated case law, at least since 
Constitutional Court Judgment No. 455/1990: see, among many 
others, Judgment No. 432/2005, No. 267/1998, No. 304/1994, and 
No. 247/1992). 
Ordinarily, therefore, the constitutional right to health 
treatment is conditioned by the necessary intermediation of 
Parliament and is not a “full and unconditional” right a priori but 
becomes so following legislative intervention (“to the extent that 
the legislator, through a not unreasonable balancing of 
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constitutional values and the proportionality of the objectives 
consequently determined by existing resources, ordains adequate 
opportunities to have access to health care”: Constitutional Court 
Judgment No. 304/94; with opportune “determination of the 
instruments, times and methods of implementation”: Judgment. 
No. 455/1990). 
All this, however, does not imply unconditional discretion 
at the hands of the legislative power with regard to identifying the 
health treatments that can be provided; nor can financial 
requirements be used to indiscriminately reduce the right to 
health of citizens at will. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court 
subjects legislative regulation to checks of the double cascade 
type. 
On the one hand, the Court reserves “external” control over 
the correct “balancing of the constitutional values that the 
legislator carries out in implementing the right to health care” to 
itself. This, in particular, is to ascertain that the albeit justified 
“requirements relating to the equilibrium of public finance” do 
not assume “an absolutely preponderant weight”, a symptomatic 
indicator of being “presented with a plainly unreasonable exercise 
of legislative discretion” (Judgment no. 260/1990). 
On the other hand, the Court sets a peremptory limit to the 
same legislative discretion, excluding any possible balance with 
other values or needs: the guarantee of “an inalienable and 
Constitutionally protected core consisting of the right to health as 
an inviolable domain of human dignity that requires the pre-
empting of situations without protection and that may undermine 
the implementation of that right” (among many, see No. 509/2000, 
No. 252/2001, No. 432/2005; and similar, No. 354/2008, No. 299 
and No. 269/2010, and No. 61/2011; the Court sometimes adopts 
similar expressions, such as “essential”, “irreducible” or “non-
reducible” nucleus). 
The case law of the Italian Supreme Court also follows this 
line of interpretation. It is now an acquis, in the precedents of the 
Italian Supreme Court, “that health has acquired the qualification 
of a subjective, fundamental and absolute right, and it has been 
added that at present a “solid nucleus of the law” has been 
identified that cannot be suppressed whatever the needs of the 
community, imposed by the very principle of social solidarity” 
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(according to a recent and well-known pronouncement of the Joint 
Civil Sessions in Judgment No. 174611/2006). 
It follows that the right to health “stands above the 
administration in such a way that it has no power, even for 
reasons of particular public interest, not only to weaken it, but 
even indirectly to prejudice it in point of fact”, because by 
affecting a fundamental right, the Administration “acts in point of 
fact”, since “its power on this matter cannot be legally configured” 
(Judgment No. 17461/2006, cited above; and in the same vein, 
Joint Sessions, Judgment No. 20922/1992). Ultimately, a 
“constitutionally protected right with a rigid core” emerges, one 
that “cannot be definitively sacrificed or compromised”, in the 
face of which the public authorities have only the task of the mere 
practical verification of the conditions that make protection 
indispensable, with no possible balancing of different interests. 
Although these principles are affirmed in relation to the 
administrative authorities, the Court infers them directly from 
constitutional constraints (and on the basis of constitutional case 
law) and they are therefore well equipped to oppose legislative 
power too.  
Having thus framed the conceptual terms, a further 
analytical effort is now required in order to consider, in particular, 
the cases examined by the Constitutional Court in order to 
identify the boundaries of the “essential, non-reducible nucleus” 
of the right to health and to verify whether it can be invoked in the 
case presented today.  
As might be imagined, the cases concretely taken into 
consideration by the Judge’s ruling on legislation are very 
diversified. 
For example, the Constitutional Court held that it is not 
possible to infer from the “core” of the right to health (among 
other things) the universal provision of so-called additional 
services not directly provided for as essential at national level but 
at Regional level (Judgment No. 455/1990): voluntary recourse to 
“indirect assistance” (i.e. in private centres) for continuous or 
prolonged rehabilitation services, where (albeit under different 
conditions) they are available in public ones (Judgment No. 
304/1994); reimbursement for treatment abroad for contingent 
reasons by financially able individuals or those with spending 
limits (Judgment No. 247/1992); the right to receive treatment 
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under particular conditions (with reference to thermal treatments, 
heliotherapy and so forth: Judgment No. 559/1987). 
On the other hand, the Court held that the irreducible core 
of the right to health was particularly compromised by the 
exclusion of reimbursement for essential diagnostic services, albeit 
costly ones, with facilities holding external contracts, if the public 
ones were not supplied with the same equipment, whenever 
“particular conditions of necessity that cannot otherwise be 
resolved” or “treatments and interventions that cannot otherwise 
be fulfilled”; other cases are the exclusion of the reimbursement of 
expenses incurred in private centres, in the absence of prior 
authorisation, whenever there are “conditions of utter urgency” 
(Judgment No. 267/1995 and No. 509/2000), and the exclusion 
from clinical trials of new drugs “in urgent cases of extreme 
therapeutic need without alternative solutions”, when “it is 
unacceptable, by virtue of the principle of equality, that the 
material enjoyment of this fundamental right depends on the 
different economic conditions of the individuals concerned”. In 
such cases, “from the point of view of the constitutional guarantee 
of health as a right [...], neither the establishment of reduced sales 
prices for medicinal products [...] nor the allocation [...] of a sum 
apportioned to municipalities [...] for the support of indigent 
persons” (Judgment No. 185/1998) appear to be adequate 
solutions; more generally, in any case, the provision of so-called 
life-saving therapy is prejudiced. 
It is therefore clear that the cases examined are varied and 
far from homogeneous; nevertheless, some interpretative 
constants do seem to emerge. The “non-reducible nucleus” of the 
right to health (which allows of no balancing) is recognisable 
under the following conditions: the objective gravity of the 
condition; the urgency of or the absolute need for the treatment; the 
unsustainability of the cost for the patient, or the unsuitability of 
alternative treatments on a clinical or organisational level. 
Under such conditions, the public authorities have a 
constitutional obligation to ensure that health care is provided, 
otherwise they would be exposing the patient to an “absolute lack 
of protection” (Judgment No. 309/1999). Expressed with regard to 
innovative treatments, the obligation set out in Article 32 of the 
Constitution emerges “in relation to patients suffering from 
conditions” for which “there are no other valid treatments using 
SANDULLI – ORPHAN DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES 
520 
 
drugs or treatments already authorised for these conditions”, 
while “in other cases, namely when there is the possibility of a 
treatment already tested and validated, any claim that the State 
must still be required to provide other medical services, even if 
only hypothetically effective, free of charge would not be 
reasonable” (Judgment No. 185/1998). 
Albeit with some necessary amplifications outlined below, 
the subject of orphan drugs appears to meet the constitutional 
requirements set out so far. The prerequisites of the special legal 
framework more amply described above are, in fact, the particular 
gravity of the condition to be treated (such as causing danger to 
life or seriously disabling chronic disorders, thus making 
treatment both indispensable and urgent), the absence of serious 
alternative interventions, both on the clinical level (because, by 
definition, there are no other suitable drugs for treatment on the 
market, as the law does not allow, in such a case, a drug to be 
classed as orphan), and from the financial point of view (because 
the rarity of the disease makes any return on investment highly 
uncertain, so that, given the absence of a clear and guaranteed 
legal framework, it is unlikely that a pharmaceutical industry will 
invest in the sector), the impossibility for citizens to bear the cost 
of providing health care (because, once again, the rarity of the 
disease makes it difficult to amortise the costs of research and 
development of the drug, leading to an inevitable increase in the 
cost of individual treatment).  
In other words, the current legal framework on orphan 
drugs seems to be designed expressly to protect the essential and 
irreducible core of the right to health of patients suffering from 
rare conditions. This is achieved through the inclusion of a series 
of derogations, prerogatives and incentives, necessary and 
sufficient to counterbalance (or at least reduce) the diseconomies 
that would otherwise inevitably arise in scientific research and the 
treatment of rare diseases.  
This does not rule out, of course, that in the abstract, 
equivalent regulatory solutions may be found that would be able 
to produce an equal degree of defence for the protected interest 
(which, it must be reiterated, is directly that of patients and only 
indirectly that of companies holding marketing authorisation in 
the orphan sectors).  
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11. The balance of the current distribution of expenditure, 
borne jointly by public and private economic operators 
In view of the impossibility of denying protection to 
patients suffering from rare diseases by setting limits on the cost 
of orphan drugs, it is necessary to verify whether the coverage of 
such charges must in fact be borne by the public sector or whether 
it can (and to what extent) continue to be borne by other private 
economic operators, as established by the current provisions. 
In this regard, two elements have to be considered: the need 
to ensure the containment of public spending (and therefore not to 
lay the entire burden of pharmaceutical expenditure on the public 
purse) and, on the other hand, the right of pharmaceutical 
companies not to suffer unjustified prejudice to their freedom of 
enterprise. 
The following aspects thus need to be assessed: whether 
there is a constitutionally supported criterion whereby the 
sacrifice of a specific category of economic operators for the sake 
of the public interest in containing expenditure is not only allowed 
but also necessary, and what the conditions necessary for this 
sacrifice to take place are, all the while respecting the principle of 
proportionality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, it must be 
assessed whether this sacrifice continues to be justified, also in the 
light of the constitutional principles, despite the increase in 
pharmaceutical expenditure on orphan drugs. 
In order to examine these aspects, on the one hand, the 
experience of other sectors (relating to the provision of services of 
general economic interest) in which the obligations of universal 
service are covered by forms of compensation between all the 
operators would appear particularly useful as would the 
conclusions that have become consolidated in case law regarding 
the regulation of obligatory discounts on the negotiated price of 
medicines (the effects of which can be likened, for our purposes, to 
the current legislative framework on containment), imposed on 
pharmaceutical companies and wholesalers53 to safeguard the 
objectives of containing public spending54. 
                                                   
53 See F. Sorrentino, I principi costituzionali che regolano i prezzi dei farmaci, in 
Seminari di studi giuridici in materia di farmaci (1995), “The reference to Article 32 
of the Constitution takes on different meanings. With regard to prices it may 
justify the possibility for the State to impose ‘discounts’ on companies as an 
exception to the provisions on general price regulation. The discount 
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Of course, a number of essential public services have been 
affected by processes of opening up to competition law. If market 
logic were strictly applied in these sectors, access to essential 
services would be precluded to a wide range of citizens, especially 
the weakest and most needy, if, for example, they reside in 
sparsely populated areas or areas that are more difficult to reach, 
or find themselves in economic or social difficulties. The European 
legal order, based, among other things, on the principles of social 
and territorial cohesion and solidarity, stipulates that the 
community should be guaranteed access to these essential 
services, even if doing so does not meet economic criteria and, 
therefore, there is no economic return for the company providing 
the service. In this case, although the service provided cannot be 
remunerated, Member States may impose public service or 
universal service obligations on operators. 
The concept of universal service is particularly important in 
certain service sectors of general economic interest, such as 
electricity, postal services, rail services, and electronic 
communications, and this, perhaps, is the most noteworthy. The 
public service obligations that must be guaranteed to all users 
include, among other things, telephone line connection and an 
Internet service with a connection above a certain transmission 
speed. 
Operators providing this service receive a refund for the 
costs from a specially created fund to which all operators using 
public telecommunications networks contribute. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                            
necessarily erodes the profit margin of the entrepreneur and can also cancel it 
and turn it into a loss, but it is an imposed financial obligation, which draws its 
foundation from Article 23 of the Constitution, arising from a result that relates 
to the value of health codified in Article 32. If Article 41 guarantees any 
entrepreneur, including the medicine manufacturers, a profit margin for a 
single product, the need for an investigation to establish the costs of individual 
products, it is possible that - under other constitutional provisions, these profits 
might in some way be cancelled, eroded, or even turned into imposed forms of 
consideration and then into losses”. 
54 As of 1998, a mechanism for the annual planned pharmaceutical expenditure 
ceiling has been set up (see Law No. 449/1997), so that in the event of exceeding 
the maximum spending ceiling borne by the national health service, the deficit 
is shared between producers and distributors, in particular through the 
imposition of a proportional reduction in the producers’ revenue margin of up 
to 60% with the remaining 40% coverage of the breakthrough to be borne by the 
Regions. 
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costs of the universal service in the sector are proportionally 
“spread out” among the companies that receive benefits in terms 
of profits operating in a given market.  
Thus, as the firms in the specific sector benefit from 
operating in that particular market area, they have to bear the 
financial burden of those parts of the sector’s business that are 
less, or only marginally, profitable. From this point of view, the 
hypothesis of universal service – even if, strictly speaking, it 
cannot be considered fully superimposable on that of orphan 
drugs – can however constitute a useful reminder in analogical 
terms, because it allows us to confirm that the case examined here 
is not the only one where the law considers that the companies 
enjoying the greatest economic benefits in the sector of reference 
have to bear the costs for activities that are less or only marginally 
remunerative and that, however, must necessarily be carried out 
in the pursuit of the constitutional rights of individuals and the 
good functioning of the overall system.  
Returning now to the pharmaceutical sector, it has on 
several occasions been reiterated that “the additional sacrifice 
imposed on producers is part of a complex economic manoeuvre 
that expresses an overall and broader plan intended, on the one 
hand, to reduce healthcare expenditure and, on the other, to 
acquire resources to finance it by forfeiting part of the revenues of 
the players in the drug supply chain, in order to meet the non-
reducible need to guarantee essential medicines or medicines for 
chronic diseases to the widest possible number of citizens without 
further aggravating the State budget beyond the limits of the 
financial sustainability of a national economy already in crisis” 
(Council of State., Sec. III, No. 2686/2014). 
In other words, there are requirements that the legislator 
considers paramount (in the case at hand, the containment of 
public expenditure and the protection of the health of patients 
without alternative therapies), for which it is justified to impose 
compulsory financial obligations55 on a specific category of 
                                                   
55 In its Judgment No. 70/1960, the Constitutional Court clarified that “a 
financial obligation is imposed in accordance with Article 23 of the Constitution 
when it is established by an act of authority without the consent of the party on 
which it is imposed, whatever the name given by the law imposing it may be” 
and can occur not only “when the obligation established by the authority 
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entities, whose freedom to conduct a business, although 
constitutionally guaranteed under Article 41 of the Constitution, 
may be to some extent reduced. 
And, in fact, “social goals cannot replace economic 
calculations as a guiding criterion for business activity, but they 
do indicate that when there are specific objectives to pursue, and 
there is a need to protect social needs of equal or greater 
constitutional importance than market autonomy, the legislator 
may well intervene with regard to commercial activities, reducing 
the margin of autonomy of enterprises, thus directing economic 
activity for social purposes”. 
Recently, in its Judgment No. 70/2017, the Constitutional 
Court, called upon to rule on the coverage mechanism for 
pharmaceutical expenditure for innovative medicines, stated that 
“the balance between the need to disseminate and promote 
pharmaceutical innovation and thus protect public health, and 
that of rationalising and containing healthcare expenditure is 
achieved by the challenged provision through a reduction in the 
margins obtainable by companies producing non-innovative 
medicines protected by a patent”, and these companies are called 
upon to contribute to a system, that of the refundability of 
medicines supplied under the convention, “from which they 
themselves derive undoubted benefits”. 
The Community Courts too (with a judgement of the Court 
of Justice, Sec. IV, 2 April 2009 in C-352/07) have affirmed that 
States can issue regulations to regulate the consumption of 
pharmaceutical products, “safeguarding the financial balance of 
their health systems” also through the reduction of the sale price 
of all or only some drugs. In such cases, unlike what has been said 
for orphan drugs above, the fact that the State receives part of the 
revenues of pharmaceutical companies does not automatically 
(and indeed not even on average) translate into a failure (or 
reduction) in the provision of essential health care to citizens. This, 
once again, is by virtue of the different characteristics and 
structures of these markets (competition, profit margins, absolute 
numbers of patients treated, and the actual impact of annual 
fluctuations in treatment provided, etc.).  
                                                                                                                            
consists in the payment of a sum of money, but also when the pecuniary 
sacrifice results from the reduction of a part of the profit otherwise due”. 
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In the conflict between the need to contain public 
expenditure and free economic initiative, therefore, the latter may 
be recessionary: it is therefore necessary to verify within which 
limits this sacrifice is admissible as non-discriminatory and not 
disproportionate. The question thus arises as to whether, among 
the various economic operators involved, the manufacturers of 
non-orphan drugs are the category that can and should actually 
bear the cost of spending for them. In the pharmaceutical sector, 
“manufacturers occupy a very peculiar and prominent position, 
contributing directly and incisively to determine the reduced price 
of the reimbursable drug and are, therefore, in a position (known 
as “information asymmetry”) of undoubted advantage over other 
players in the supply chain and, on the other hand, are able to 
increase the volume of demand through promotion and 
dissemination” (Council of State, Sec. III, No. 2686/2014). 
Compared to the other parties involved (such as 
wholesalers or pharmacists, and assuming the need not to involve 
the producers of orphan drugs), the pharmaceutical companies 
that produce non-orphan drugs hold, in the market of reference, a 
position of greater advantage, which diversifies them from other 
operators and makes the sacrifice imposed on them less 
burdensome. The principle of tax equality implies that “like 
situations must match like tax regimes, and in the case of different 
situations there must be a different tax regime” (Constitutional 
Court July 6, 1972, n. 120). In the case at hand, the different 
treatment given to manufacturers of non-orphan drugs is justified 
precisely because of their different position within the market in 
question. 
Moreover, in compliance with the provisions of Article 53 
of the Constitution, the solidarity-based ability to contribute 
justifies drawing more greatly on the wealth of those with greater 
economic possibilities and “may involve a redistribution of such 
wealth in favour of subjects who, even within the same economic 
sector, bear overwhelming burdens and difficulties in any case 
disproportionate to their current possibilities” (Council of State, 
Sec. III, No. 2686/2014). The coverage mechanism for the 
pharmaceutical expenditure for orphan drugs creates, in reality, 
the effect of a “redistribution of wealth among the elements of the 
supply chain” (Council of State, Sec. III, No. 2686/2014) and, 
moreover, respects the ability of the individual company to 
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contribute, as the share of coverage is determined proportionately 
to the turnover from the sale of non-orphan drugs56. 
It should also be borne in mind that the burden of covering 
pharmaceutical expenditure in excess of the state coverage ceiling 
is not entirely borne by pharmaceutical companies producing non-
orphan drugs, since in the case of hospital pharmaceutical 
expenditure, the burden is shared equally between the 
pharmaceutical companies and the Regions that have exceeded 
the regional expenditure57 ceiling. As for national pharmaceutical 
expenditure, coverage not only falls to the pharmaceutical 
companies but also to the distribution chain, namely to 
wholesalers and pharmacists (in retail sales, the costs are also 
borne by the companies that produce orphan drugs)58. 
In conclusion, in the words of a ruling by the Council of 
State, the legislator did not intend to “expropriate the profits of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, sacrificing their economic freedom 
protected by Article 41 of the Constitution, but to impose a modest 
and temporary levy on profits in such a way as to guarantee both 
a saving in pharmaceutical sector health expenditure in the 
pursuit of the public interest - which certainly prevails over the 
selfish interest asserted by the producers themselves - in the 
provision of essential levels of pharmaceutical assistance, in the 
face of the increasingly pressing need to contain public 
expenditure; and finally, with regard to producers and despite the 
current extraordinary negative economic circumstances, to 
generate a reasonable profit margin constituting the inviolable 
nucleus and the irrepressible goal of private economic initiative”. 
Having established therefore, that the need to guarantee the 
protection of the health of those suffering from rare diseases 
justifies a lessening of private economic freedom and that, in the 
case at hand, this lessening necessarily involves the category of 
pharmaceutical companies that produce non-orphan drugs, the 
question now arises as to whether this mechanism has been 
undermined in any way by the progressive increase in 
pharmaceutical expenditure for orphan drugs in recent years. In 
                                                   
56 On this point see the case law of the Constitutional Court concerning 
discounts on the price of medicines and, in particular, Judgment No. 102/1993, 
No. 144/1972, and No. 70/1960. 
57 See Article 15(7) Decree Law No. 95/2012. 
58 See Article 5(3) Decree Law No. 159/2007. 
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other words, the question arises as to whether the reduction in the 
rights of the pharmaceutical companies that have to bear the cost 
of coverage is also justified in terms of the increase in this 
expenditure. 
The question must be addressed from the points of view of 
two distinct and concurrent terms: the proportionality of the 
measure and the tolerability of the sacrifice on the part of non-
orphan drugs marketing authorisation holders; the absence of the 
risk of bias (in terms of undue enrichment) in favour of companies 
holding marketing authorisation for orphan drugs. 
As for the first profile, the necessary starting point must be 
the statistical data available. As already mentioned above, 
expenditure on orphan drugs grew between 2010 and 2015 from 
€657 million to €1,393 million, rising from 3.50% to 6.1% of total 
pharmaceutical expenditure. This growth appears, in absolute 
terms, far from negligible; what stands out, however, is the share 
of the actual cost shift borne by the other pharmaceutical 
companies within the overall cost per pharmaceutical expenditure 
and payback dynamics. Considering the data (the latest certain 
figures), for the year 2013 (recording an expenditure of €914mln, 
equal to 4.65% of the total), the overall data are as follows: a) total 
pharmaceutical expenditure borne by the State amounting to 
€16,625.2 mln; b) hospital pharmaceutical expenditure amounting 
to €4.497 mln; c) an overspend in terms of the ceiling of €773 mln, 
d) the total share of the coverage borne by marketing 
authorisation holders amounting to €368 mln (the other half being 
borne by the Regions, as explained above in §3), and e) the 
coverage specifically attributable to orphan drugs borne by 
marketing authorisation holders, amounting to €59mln.  
In concrete terms, the cost of coverage for orphan drugs, 
spread pro quota among all the marketing authorisation holders is 
therefore 1.3% of their aggregate turnover in relation to hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure and just 0.4% of the total turnover for 
the sale of drugs covered by the national health service. This 
figure, however, is not yet fully representative of the actual annual 
turnover of pharmaceutical companies in Italy, which obviously 
also includes medicines paid for directly by patients.  
In the light of these data, the sums levied on 
pharmaceutical companies (also considering the presumable 
increase of the estimates in 2013, following the mentioned trend) 
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still appears to amount to a fraction of their total revenues, both in 
terms of modalities and quantities, which can be considered quite 
tolerable from the economic point of view, also considering the 
profit margins from the average revenues in the pharmaceutical 
sector. This is without prejudice, therefore, to the “reasonable 
profit margin” that, in the current economic circumstances, the 
Council of State considers “the inviolable nucleus and the 
irrepressible goal of private business”. On the contrary, as 
mentioned above, extending the payback system to orphan drugs 
would produce a substantial erosion of the revenues and profit 
margins of manufacturing companies (up to the median value of 
12% of the turnover), beyond the thresholds of tolerability and 
proportionality of the duty discussed so far. It should also be 
borne in mind that the coverage for in-hospital pharmaceutical 
expenditure is borne equally by the pharmaceutical companies 
and Italy’s Regions, in a context in which orphan drugs are used 
mainly in the hospital sector. National legislation therefore hooks 
the sacrifice required of private individuals to a similar sacrifice 
borne by the regional budgets in order to ensure the overall 
sustainability of the measure. Lastly, the amount of duty payable 
is substantially predictable, as is its evolution over time. 
On the whole, this form of levy is not unjustified in the light 
of the case law of the Constitutional Court on the ability to pay 
and the corollaries of predictability, reasonableness, congruity, 
and proportionality. Essentially, the existing coverage system, 
despite growing pharmaceutical expenditure for orphan drugs, 
does not seem to call for a disproportionate or intolerable sacrifice 
on the part of the companies concerned, nor does it conflict with 
the principles of equality, equal treatment, and respect for the 
ability to contribute. On the contrary, it seems to include a 
reasonable balance of conflicting interests: the protection of the 
health of those suffering from rare illnesses and the containment 
of public spending. 
The problem of the general sustainability, in the medium 
and long term, of the current mechanisms to cover overspending 
in the health sector (as a whole) is different and broader, in the 
context of a prolonged quota system applied to available public 
resources. Of course, it is likely that, with respect to the current 
dynamics, the model will have to be rethought in the future; on 
the basis of the data set out above, however, the share of coverage 
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arising from overspending for orphan drugs (2013 data) amounts 
to just 16.1% of the total costs of the coverage for in-hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure, a percentage that shrinks even more 
compared with total pharmaceutical expenditure. It therefore 
appears difficult, at present, to attribute to the cost of orphan 
drugs an impact such as to undermine the constitutional adequacy 
of the payback system as it is currently regulated. 
With regard to the second question, relating to risks of 
overcompensation to the undue benefit of orphan drug marketing 
authorisation holders, it has been conjectured that this may occur 
when a drug is improperly termed “orphan” in the absence of any 
real clinical grounds (constituting a waste for the national health 
service and super-profits for the pharmaceutical companies). It 
may also happen when a drug is used outside its own sphere for 
diseases that are not actually rare (for example, when they contain 
active ingredients that can be used to treat both rare and common 
illnesses; or when the orphan drug is developed for a rare sub-
population of patients suffering from a common condition but can 
also be used also to treat all the other patients suffering from that 
condition). 
In practice, however, such risks are averted both upstream 
and down. Upstream, by means of procedures for the 
classification of orphan medicinal products (EC Regulation 
141/2000 expressly provides for cases of designation for sub-
populations, introducing appropriate safeguards; moreover, in the 
case of designations for rare and non-rare diseases, diverse 
medicinal products exist, and are accounted for differently). 
Downstream, they are avoided thanks to mechanisms for 
monitoring and controlling the use of the drugs themselves (it is, 
in fact, common knowledge that in most cases, the use of orphan 
drugs is directly detected in the so-called AIFA registers and 
therefore subject to direct monitoring for each single clinical case 
treated; moreover, 86% of orphan drugs are authorised for just one 
type of treatment and a further 11% for two). 
At the very least, such risks may be invoked to justify 
revisions to the authorisation and control procedures but not to 
call into question a legislative framework whose constitutionality 
and effectiveness do not appear to be in doubt. 
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12. Extension of the payback obligation to pharmaceutical 
companies producing orphan drugs, and possible effects on the 
right to health of patients suffering from rare diseases 
The analysis carried out so far has ascertained the 
constitutional need for legislation to guarantee preferential 
treatment for research on - and production of - orphan drugs. At 
the same, it has confirmed the constitutionality, within the limits 
of reasonable proportionality, of mechanisms for the partial 
offload of the costs incurred onto companies operating in the 
ordinary pharmaceutical sector. It has also shown that the current 
legal framework, based on negotiated prices for orphan drugs, in 
the absence of “ceilings” on final expenditure, is a model capable 
of validly ensuring the need to safeguard the “non-reducible core” 
of the right to health of patients with rare conditions.  
At this point in the analysis, however, it remains to be 
considered, following the logical-expositive line of thought set out 
in the introduction, whether there are any other possible 
regulatory alternatives capable of respecting the constitutional 
constraints on the subject, likewise able to guarantee the ultimate 
goal of health protection but offering a different distribution of the 
economic burden this entails compared with the current system. 
In other words, the issue is that of the existence of possible forms 
of sharing and partial reallocation of the sacrifice previously 
inflicted on pharmaceutical companies and the Regions, including 
at the expense – under certain circumstances and conditions – of 
the very companies that produce orphan drugs. 
This question is also reasonable in the light of the proposals 
for reform within the sector, the legislative amendments already 
proposed (but not yet adopted), and the models applied in 
apparently similar cases. Serious reflection on the subject, 
moreover, is also called for by the principles upheld in 
constitutional case law on the subject of innovative medicines, 
most recently set out in repeatedly cited sentence No. 70/2015. 
Here, the Court considered it constitutional to transfer the 
overspend on State coverage to the rest of the pharmaceutical 
companies; nevertheless, it also remarked that this system may 
also be of temporary duration, with periodic review of the 
legislation, in virtue, among other things, of a “reduction of the 
contributions for companies holding marketing authorisation for 
non-innovative drugs”, the “gradual transfer of the burden onto 
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the companies with marketing authorisation for innovative 
drugs”, and the plurality of “options available to the legislator”. 
For example, if they are contemplated possible corrections to the 
current system for covering overspend on orphan drugs, we might 
consider establishing ad hoc funding up to an annual maximum 
figure, which is what happens in the case of innovative drugs, or 
else fixing annual budget ceilings, established or negotiated per 
individual orphan drug or manufacturing company. 
Beyond the obvious need to evaluate the actual 
configurations of these hypotheses on a case by case basis, these 
solutions raise some serious doubts in terms of conceptual 
approach. First of all, it would appear highly questionable to use 
the legislative framework for innovative drugs as a parameter of 
comparison. While it is true that the two categories – innovative 
drugs and orphan drugs – are comparable in that they impact on 
and change the consolidated flow of demand for treatment, there 
are some features that distinguish them: an innovative drug may 
compete with other drugs for treatment of same condition (thus 
creating compensation between over - and under-budgeting), 
unlike an orphan drug that by definition operates in a field not 
covered by another comparable drug. Innovative drugs are open 
to potentially vast consumption, whereas that of orphan drugs is 
extremely limited. Lastly, orphan drugs (with very few 
exceptions) do not normally guarantee a cure but rather the 
stabilisation of an illness in its chronic phase: the number of 
patients treated is therefore inevitably destined to increase. 
In concrete terms, considering the current methods of 
quantifying and allocating the percentages of national health 
spending allocated to pharmaceutical expenditure, it is difficult to 
imagine an imposition of ceilings or quotas that would not 
produce direct negative effects on the production and 
administration of an orphan drug. The fundamental problem is 
how to establish the degree of public funding due to (positive or 
negative) variation in historical expenditure: an approach 
structurally incompatible with the introduction of new orphan 
drugs or even, simply, with the extension of existing drugs to new 
patients. Expenditure on orphan drugs is in fact by definition 
incremental, so a ceiling based on historical trends could never be 
respected.  
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Once the annual expenditure ceiling has been reached, in 
the absence of market competitors and ruling out a reduction in 
the number of patients being treated, a random patient will find 
him/herself bereft of treatment, unless the manufacturing 
company agrees to deliver the drug anyway and free of charge. 
Naturally, the health system cannot rely on liberal concessions on 
the part of the entrepreneurial class, nor (in such cases) can it 
speculate on the ethical constraint that may have led them to make 
such concessions.  
Practically speaking, the imposition of spending “ceilings” 
that can also be sustainable for companies producing orphan 
drugs would presuppose a radical rethinking of the current 
models of financing health expenditure, with a shift away from 
the criterion of previous expenditure to techniques for forecasting 
increases in demand. In other words, “programmatic” spending 
thresholds must be established, quantifying the foreseeable 
increase in patients suffering from rare diseases needing 
treatment, considering their inevitable growth as an effect of the 
chronicization of existing patients and the onset of new cases. 
These solutions, apart from the obvious technical difficulties, do 
not appear realistically feasible. 
It is true, from another perspective, that some specific 
orphan drugs could be identified whose levels of turnover are 
such as to be able to allow them - in the abstract and from a purely 
financial point of view - to be subjected to an albeit partial or 
gradual payback regime. Beyond ethical aspects outlined above, 
such measures could have a very negative effect on future 
investment in new orphan drugs, undermining the confidence of 
the industrial sector in the stability of the current regulatory 
framework and the economic guarantees it can provide. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the drugs with the 
highest sales revenues are also those that ensure the best clinical 
results and target a wider pool of patients. Imposing a payback 
obligation on these drugs would therefore discourage other 
pharmaceutical companies from investing in that sector (affecting 
the profit differential), and thus prevent the growth of competition 
in research into the most promising drugs and sectors.  
The stability of regulatory framework, on the other hand, 
appears to be even more important in the light of current 
production scenario, which is result - as previously described - of 
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a rigorous selection of companies that have been able to remain on 
the market and drugs that have been able to reach the stage of 
final approval and commercialization. In order to assess 
sustainability of a compulsory levy on proceeds of individual 
orphan drugs on the market today, the dissuasive effect on the 
entry of new operators in this market and the launch of new trials 
cannot be ignored. 
The same consideration also holds for an additional 
possible alternative solution: the “payment at results” mechanism, 
in other words a payment conditional on the successful efficacy of 
the orphan drug on the single patient suffering for a rare disease. 
This mechanism could be effective for innovative drugs: the aim of 
these drugs is improving the condition of the patient compared to 
drugs that are already on the market. Therefore, it is expected that 
innovative drugs are better than the previous ones. Considering 
that the number of patients targeted by the innovative drug is not 
limited, pharmaceutical companies are encouraged by the market 
to develop such drugs.  
However, for orphan drugs for the treatment of rare 
diseases the situation is different. These drugs are intended to 
treat a limited number of patients and, usually, in the absence of 
any previous treatment for the disease. We have already described 
the system of incentives aimed at covering research and 
development costs and the strict rules for marketing 
authorization. The “payment at results” mechanism would be a 
strong disincentive to pharmaceutical companies’ investments in 
the sector. On the contrary, it is necessary to work at the removal 
of the distortions reported in the first part of this article. But, if 
anything, we need to improve effective and proper controls and 
develop rules in order to prevent distortive effects.  
 
 
